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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the performance of Norwegian equity funds 
during the period from 1998 to 2008. We have identified the best and the worst 
performing funds during the period based on five performance measures:  Sharpe ratio, 
Treynor ratio, Jensen’s Alpha, Appraisal ratio and Modigliani and Modigliani measure. 
The analysis focuses on the funds’ performance in the form of risk-adjusted return. We 
compare the performances of the funds, and investigate whether they achieve a higher 
risk-adjusted excess return than the market benchmark, as well we check if equity funds 
hold the risk profile they claim to have in their prospects.  
 
The performance evaluation methods used to rank the mutual funds have given results 
with strong positive correlation. The funds with the best performance according to the 
majority of  the performance measures were Alfred Berg GAMBAK, ODIN Norge and 
Storebrand Verdi.   
 
The results show that none of the 36 funds generate a significant positive risk-adjusted 
excess return above the market. Most of the funds’ risk profiles were strikingly low as 
compared to the market benchmark, despite the fact that they claim to have high risk 
portfolio. We also observed that individual funds within the same management company 
had a similar risk profile. 
 
Further we examine funds’ performance persistence and funds’ stock picking and market 
timing ability.  We come to conclusion that there is no performance persistence during the 
observation period among Norwegian equity funds. When it comes to market timing 
ability we identify 1 fund out of 36 that exhibits positive market timing ability for both 
tests we employ. We conclude that market timing ability is rare and we can confirm the 
validity of Efficient Market Hypothesis in Norwegian stock market. 
 
We have identified that funds of larger management companies did, on average, by 20% 
better than funds from companies whose assets under management did not exceed 15 bn 
NOK. 
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Finaly, we investigate whether change in ownership of management company has an 
effect on fund performance, we concentrate especially on acquisition of stand-alone 
companies by larger financial groups. We conclude that change in ownership has an 
impact on funds’ performance and it seems to have the same effect (positive or negative) 
on all the acquired company’s funds. However, we do not find any evidence that 
independent stand-alone companies performance tend to deteriorate after being bought by 
big financial groups. We find that two companies did improve their results while the 
performance of other two deteriorated after acquisition. 
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There has been an incredible growth in the number of mutual funds and the total assets 
under their management in the last two decades in Norway. Since mutual funds have 
become a part of everyday life for an average Norwegian we would like to look closer at 
the results mutual funds have exhibited during the last decade.  
 
We approach this problem by investigate the performance and efficiency of Norwegian 
equity funds in period 1998-2008. 
 
First of all, we rank the funds that have been around the whole decade using different 
performance measures: Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, Jensen’s Alpha, Appraisal ratio and 
Modigliani and Modigliani measure, thus identifying the best and worst funds of the 
decade. 
We compare the performances of the funds, and investigate whether they achieve a higher 
risk-adjusted excess return than the market benchmark, as well we examine the risk 
profiles of the funds and check if equity funds hold the risk profile they claim to have in 
their advertisement brochures.  
 
Secondly, we carry out performance persistence tests to see whether investors could build 
a strategy that would bring him or her extra returns by looking at the past performance of 
funds.  We also investigate whether Norwegian equity funds exhibit any market timing 
and stock picking abilities by employing Treynor, Mazuy and Henriksson ,Merton tests. 
Existence of such abilities would put in doubt the validity of Efficient Market Hypothesis 
for Norwegian stock market. 
 
Further we investigate whether size of management company has an effect of exhibited 
performance. We proceed by dividing management companies in 2 groups according to 
their size and looking at the average performace of each of the group’s funds.   
 
Finaly, we investigate the affect of the change of management company’s ownership to 
funds’ performance. We concentrate on stand-alone companies who were bought up 
1 Introduction 
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during our sample period. We estimate and analyze performance measures of the funds 
three years before and three years after acquisition takes place. 
 
We start our paper with insight in mutual fund industry by looking at the developments in 
Norwegian mutual fund market. In 3rd part we provide our reader with more information 
on mutual funds, namely, reasons for investing in funds, fund types and regulatory 
framework. As investing in equity funds inevitably involves risk we devote section 4 to 
exploration of this phenomenon. In part 5 we outline the theoretical background that is 
needed to achieve the goals of this paper followed by methodological implications in 
section 6.  Part 7 of this paper we devote to the description of data we employ in our tests. 
In part 8 we present our findings and section 9 concludes our thesis. 
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Mutual funds play an important role as a vehicle for ever-increasing amounts of individual 
investor savings. There has been an incredible growth in the number of mutual funds and 
the total assets under their management in the last two decades in Norway. However, 
Norwegians stay far behind other European and Scandinavian countries when it comes to 
percentage of personal wealth invested in equities. Mutual fund assets equal approx. 6 
percent of total household financial assets in Norway in 2007, and 1, 4 millions 
Norwegians were shareholders in equity funds. The percentage of personal wealth 
invested in mutual funds, was around 26 in Sweden at the same time. Securities funds are 
collective investment scheme and independent legal entities. Capital invested in securities 
funds is not affected in the event of the management company’s failure. In light of the 
law’s strict requirements with respect to risk diversification and frequent valuations, only 
bank deposits are as thoroughly regulated as investment funds. 
At the end of 2007, 23 companies were licensed to manage securities funds whereas 20 of 
these 23 are also members of the Norwegian Mutual Fund Association (NMFA). At the 
end of 2006, NMFAs members had a total capital under management of NOK 343 billion. 
NOK 142 billion is attributed to the household sector. The total number of funds managed 
by NMFA members is approx. 500. Figure 2.1 illustrates the net subscription in mutual 
fund during 2003-2007. We can see an increase from about NOK 19 milliards in 2003 to 
NOK 58 milliards in 2007. As shown in the figure, it was a decline in net subscription 
from 2005 to 2006. One of the reasons could be that investments in mutual funds decrease 
the income tax,  
but from 2006 the percentage of deduction from income tax has been decreased. However, 
we can observe that the growth in subscription in mutual fund varies from year to year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Norwegian Mutual Fund Industry 
 10 
Figure 2.1 Net subscription in mutual funds( Source: Norwegian Mutual Fund 
Assosiation) 
Management companies’ aggregate operating profit was NOK 1.5 billion in 2007, about 
the same as in 2006. Management companies’ revenues largely consist of fees for 
managing securities funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Management companies operating revenues(Source: Kredittilsynet) 
 
At the end of 2007, capital under active management totalled NOK 487 billion, an 
increase of NOK 34 billion over the previous year. Assets under management in 
Norwegian securities funds rose by NOK 65 billion to reach NOK 403 billion at the end of 
2007. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Total assets on securities funds (source: Kredittilsynet) 
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2.1 Norwegian Equity Funds Market 
Our main focus in this thesis is on Norwegian equity funds who invest at least 80% of 
their portfolio in Norwegian stock market. The market for Norwegian equity funds has not 
experienced the same growth rate that the whole mutual funds industry in Norway has. 
Norwegian equity funds market has undergone many changes during the last decade. The 
capital under management by Norwegian equity funds has increased from NOK 32, 5 
billion to 53 NOK billion from 1998 to 2007. However, the total funds market share of 
Norwegian equity funds has considerably declined from 38% to 13 %.  This clearly 
reflects the investors’ shift of preferences from domestic to international equity funds. 
Number of funds varies greatly from year to year, e.g. in 1998 there were 81 funds 
classified as Norwegian equity funds, while the number plummeted to 65 in 1999. In 2007 
there were registered 71 Norwegian equity funds. During the last decade the industry has 
become more consolidated as in 1998 there were 25 companies managing Norwegian 
equity funds while in 2007 the number had reduced to 18 (and respectively equity fund 
managers from 26 to 20). 
 
DnB Nor Kapitalforvaltning is the clear market leader in Norwegian Equity funds with 25 
% market share, however it is just the 3rd biggest player in the total equity fund market in 
Norway where the market leader is SKAGEN with 30 % market share (source: 
www.vff.no).  
 
 
 12 
Mutual funds represent a collective investment offered by professionally managed 
investment companies. Private investors pool their resources to spread their money over a 
wide variety of securities.  Fund management companies mange these securities on behalf 
of the shareholders, and each investor hold a prorated share of the total funds according to 
the size of their investments. It is very expensive in terms of brokerage and trading costs to 
achieve a diversified portfolio for the average individual investor. By investing in mutual 
funds they gain the advantage of large-scale trading without needing to constantly monitor 
the market. Investors pay different fees like management fee, subscription fee and 
redemption fee, these costs can differ from one company to other.  
 
3.1 Different Types of Fund 
Equity funds are divided into various groups depending on which investment universe the 
Funds' investment mandates require them to invest in. The investment universe may be 
limited geographically, limited by business sectors(investments in particular industries) or 
it may be a combination of the two ( source: www.oslobørs.no). 
NMFA defines different types of mutual funds, but there are four main fund types, 
classified by investment policy. 
 
3.1.1 Equity Funds 
Norwegian Mutual Fund Association defines a mutual fund, as a fund that will invest at 
least 80% of funds portfolio value in shares. They can invest in fixed income securities, 
but not more than 20 % of total portfolio value. Stock or Equity funds invest primarily in 
stocks, but also may hold fixed-income or other types of securities. Funds commonly will 
hold between 4% and 5% of total assets in money market securities to provide liquidity 
necessary to meet potential redemption of shares. Stock funds are the most common fund 
investment for the average Norwegian investor. Different mutual funds groups have been 
established in Norway such as Norwegian funds, Swedish funds, Norwegian/international 
funds, Nordic funds, European funds, Asian funds, Global funds, Regional funds, sector 
funds like Finance fund, Health funds, Technology funds etc.. 
 
3  General about Mutual Funds 
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3.1.2 Bond Funds  
Bond funds invest primarily in bonds or other types of debt securities. The securities held 
by bond funds have longer maturities than money market fund’s securities. Bond funds 
specialize in the fixed-income sector with a considerable room for specialization within 
the sector. Bond funds are either taxable or tax exempt, depending on the securities in 
which the fund invests. For instance, different funds will focus on corporate bonds, 
Treasury bonds, mortgage-backed securities, or tax-free bonds. The securities that bond 
funds hold will vary in terms of risk, return, duration, volatility and other features. A 
common misconception among some investors is that bonds and bond funds have little or 
no risk, but they are subject to credit risk, prepayment risk and interest rate risk. However, 
they entail less risk than equity funds. 
 
3.1.3  Money Market Funds 
Money market funds invest in debt securities that mature in 13 months or less, and the 
average maturity of all their holdings may not exceed 90 days (Pozen,2002). These funds 
have relatively low risks compared to other mutual funds and pay dividends that generally 
reflect short-term interest rates. Money market funds typically invest in government 
securities, certificates of deposits, commercial paper of companies, and other highly liquid 
and low-risk securities. They usually offer check-writing features, and net value is fixed 
per share, so that there are no tax implications such as capital gains or losses associated 
with redemption of shares. 
 
3.1.4 Hybrid Funds 
Hybrid funds – such as balanced or asset allocation funds-invest in a combination of 
equity, debt and other securities. The combination for balanced funds is generally about 
60% in equity securities and 40% in debt securities both short and long term. Other asset 
allocation funds invest in a mix of equity and debt securities, and may change that mix 
from time to time within stated parameters. Hybrid funds give investors a unique 
possibility for achieving diversification across equity and fixed income securities. This 
portfolio composition keeps the fund from dropping considerably in a down market. 
Unfortunately, it also doesn't appreciate as quickly in an up market. Ultimately, higher 
proportion of stock investments will generate higher returns at a cost of higher risk.  
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The market shares of different types of funds that are managed by NMFA members 
(shares of total capital under management) are as follows:  
• Equity funds: 61 % 
• Balanced funds: 5 %  
• Bond funds: 12 % 
• Money market funds: 22 % (source: www.vff.no) 
 
3.2 Reasons for Saving in Mutual Funds 
As mentioned before there are several reasons for investing in mutual funds. Mutual funds 
offer investors the advantage of portfolio diversification and professional management at a 
low cost. These advantages are particularly important in the case of equity funds where 
both diversification and professional management have the potential to add value. For 
bond and money market mutual funds, the main advantage is transactional efficiency 
through professional management. The tax incentives and regulatory have also played a 
role in development of bond and money market funds.  There are three tax benefits by 
investing in mutual funds; tax-free returns, long run tax credit and reduced net wealth tax. 
Tax-free return: one part of returns on mutual funds is totally tax free; the part of returns 
which exceed the risk free rate of return is taxable. 
 
Long run tax credit means that investors do not have to pay tax on the part of returns 
exceeding risk-free rate of interest before selling their shares. As long investors do not 
move their invested capital the tax amount will be outstanding in the mutual fund and will 
give them even more return in long run. Reduced net wealth tax: shares in mutual fund and 
the most combination funds get 15 percent deduction in net wealth tax from financial year 
2007. 
 
The other advantage is the high level of operational transparency comparing to other 
financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds. Unlike banks 
and insurance companies, mutual funds do not assume credit and insurance risks and thus 
do not need to make subjective provisions against non-performing loans or to create 
actuarial reserves against future insurance claims.  Mutual funds invest in marketable 
instruments and are able to follow a “mark-to-market” valuation of their assets. But 
investors bear the investment risk, especially for equity funds when investors participate in 
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the upside potential of equities but are also exposed to substantial losses when markets are 
falling. 
 
Mutual funds require a strong and effective regulatory framework, and investors are 
protected from fraudulent behavior of funds mangers. Funds investors rely on the 
advertised investment strategies of mutual fund when selecting their funds. It is therefore 
of great importance that managers follow their declared objectives and advertised 
strategies.  Accounting and auditing rules, information disclosure and transparency 
requirements are essential and ensure investor protection. Mutual funds also require well-
developed securities markets with a high level of market integrity and liquidity.  Market 
liquidity ensures that transactions costs are low.  Market integrity means that insiders are 
barred from taking advantage of privileged information, while large shareholders and 
market intermediaries are prohibited from engaging in market manipulation (Deepthi, 
Klapper, Sulla, Vittas, 2003). 
 
3.3 Norwegian Regulations 
The fund management companies must act in the interest of the investors and are strictly 
regulated by the Norwegian Security Exchange Commission. 
Norwegian Mutual Fund Association (NMFA) has adopted mandatory industry standards 
for its members on many different issues, for instance, how the funds set up the portfolio 
to secure a diversification. It also stipulates the number of companies a fund has to invest 
in, and the maximum share of one company in the mutual fund’s portfolio. Investment 
funds have to ensure a high degree of transparency.  The fund must disclose information 
on the areas and industries the fund is investing in, and all types of costs must be publicly 
available. 
  
Fund management is subject to the Norwegian Securities Fund Act, Companies Act and a 
number of other regulations. In addition, the management company is subject to 
regulations regarding internal audits. It is the task of the Financial Supervisory Authority 
of Norway to supervise all institutions in the securities market, and it is the guarantor for 
people who save through funds that all activities are conducted properly. Simply put, the 
Commission ensures that the securities market functions well both as a source of capital 
for business, and for investors. Management companies must submit monthly reports to 
the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, which in turn follows up with local audits 
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to review operations, procedures and the organization. The results of such audits are 
publicly available information. (source: www.skagenfondene.no) 
 
3.4 UCITS 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) are a set of 
European Union directives which has been the basis for an integrated market facilitating 
the cross-border offer of collective investment funds. These rules allow collective 
investment schemes to operate freely throughout the EU on the basis of a single 
authorization from one member state.The regulation recognizes that each country within 
the European Union may differ on their specific disclosure requirements.A collective 
investment fund may apply for UCITS status in order to allow EU-wide marketing. With a 
larger market the economies of scale will reduce costs for investment managers which can 
be passed on to consumers. UCITS induces EU wide competition among mutual funds that 
is beneficial to investors by increased efficiency of fund management. 
The UCITS Directive has been, due to the EEA agreement, implemented in Norway 
through the Norwegian Securities Funds Act. It follows from this directive that UCITS 
funds approved in one EEA country may be marketed in the other EEA countries. 
Throughout Europe approximately €5 trillion are invested in collective investment 
vehicles. Of these funds about 70% are UCITS. (Source: www.euractive.com).  
 
3.5 Global Investment Performance Standards 
The GIPS standards are a set of standardized, industry-wide ethical principles that apply to 
the way investment performance is calculated and presented to prospective clients. The 
investment management industry is becoming more global. Many asset managers not only 
compete for business in their home markets, but in foreign markets as well. The North 
American and Western European markets are very well developed, but it is not the fact for 
other markets. For investment firms outside the U.S. or European Union, compliance with 
GIPS provides a high level of credibility to the calculation and presentation of investment 
performance history bringing both marketing and internal control advantages.  Being a 
GIPS compliant firm demonstrates an acceptance of ethical standards, transparency and 
integrity. These are valuable qualities for firms considering dealing with other people's 
money. 
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Today, 25 countries throughout North America, Europe, Africa, and Asia Pacific have 
adopted the GIPS standards, encouraging investment management firms to follow the 
Standards. In January 200, The Norwegian association of financial analysts decided to 
replace the Norwegian standards from 1996 with GIPS. 
 
3.6 Active versus Passive Management 
 
3.6.1 Active Fund Management 
Companies, who manage funds actively, believe that markets are not fully efficient and 
one can find undervalued stocks.  Usually two methods are used fundamental and/or 
technical analysis to select individual securities in an effort to achieve higher returns or 
outperform “the market” represented by a benchmark index.  
 
The active portfolio management is responsible for day to day buy and sells decisions in 
the fund. In order to outperform the relevant benchmark actively managed mutual funds 
uses different methods such as security selection and sector weighting. Security selection 
refers to buying large positions in certain securities in the benchmark, and sector 
weighting means overwriting or underwriting sectors in the benchmark.  Companies 
following fundamental analysis may use a top-down approach where managers first 
analyze the macroeconomics trends in the market to identify attractive sectors, industries 
and securities. The decision about the selection of individual securities comes at the end of 
this process. Conversely, a bottom-up investor ignores broad sector and economic 
conditions and instead focuses on selecting a stock based on the individual attributes of a 
company. They seek securities with attractive investment prospects regardless of industry 
or macroeconomic factors. They may require some minimum values for profitability, 
growth rate or a maximum level of a P/E ratio. The bottom-up approach assumes that 
individual companies can do well even in an industry that is not performing very well. 
Companies employing technical analysis will follow the price changes and will try to 
indicate trends in market. Technicians assume that stock prices are based more on social 
psychology than real underlying values, thus they try to identify patterns in past stock 
prices that might indicate the future price movements. Technical analysis is seldom used 
alone, most asset management companies develop their own mixture of fundamental and 
technical analysis based on which they pick stocks whose price is going to rise in the 
future. 
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3.6.2 Passive Fund Management 
Index mutual funds are passively managed; their strategy is to construct portfolios that will 
match the risk/ return profiles of underlying market benchmarks. Passive managers try to 
minimize the tracking error, or the deviation of the funds return from the return of the 
index. This may be done by two methods: full replication which is purchasing the entire 
component securities of the index in identical proportions to the index; and sampling, 
where managers often purchase statistically representative sample of securities whose 
combined total return and volatility approximate that of the index. Index funds have lower 
management fees and total expense because the trading required to keep portfolios in line 
with underlying indices is generally less than that required to “beat” the indices and there 
is no need to employ security analyst. The number of securities covered by passive 
mangers is almost unlimited due to relegation of stock selection and portfolio construction 
problem to the fast-acting computers (Pozen,2002). 
 
Passive investment management used by equity index fund is based on efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH). EMH states that stock prices already reflect all publicly available 
information and the new information are instantly absorbed in stock prices. According to 
EMH supporters, it is almost impossible to outperform the market through active 
management and stock selection based on research. This is due to the difficulty of 
obtaining new information about stock prices before anyone else. Academic studies 
suggest that index funds outperform a majority of actively managed mutual funds with 
similar risk. Expenses and transaction costs account for most of the differences between 
the passive and active investing over the long term. On the other hand, these studies focus 
on the most liquid and closely followed portions of the U.S. stock markets. Indices are 
easier to outperform in other market segments, like small cap stocks or developing 
countries where companies are not monitored by hundreds of analysts, thus there is a time 
lag between new information and price reaction that allows for profitable investments. 
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The return on mutual funds includes both income (in the form of dividends or interest 
payments) and capital gain or losses (the increase or decrease in the value of a security) 
(Simons,1998). All investment decisions involve a trade-off between risk and return. The 
capital asset pricing model posits that return and risk are positively related- higher return 
carries higher risk. Investors cannot expect higher return, without being willing to assume 
larger risks. According to Haslem (2003), Empirical test of CAPM generally find that the 
trade-off relationship between expected return and risk is an upward positively sloped 
straight line. The general nature of this trade off was also confirmed in Baker et al. (1977).  
 
Mutual fund shares are priced daily at net asset value, which, as noted, is computed by 
taking total market value of the portfolio, less fund liabilities, and dividing the reminder, 
by number of outstanding shares. Shares are sold and redeemed at NAV; they are sold 
directly to investors or indirectly through sales agents (Haslem, 2003). 
 
According to Simons (1998), funds return can be expressed as changes in a fund’s net 
asset value, assuming the reinvestment of all income and capital-gains distributions, and 
dividing it by the original net asset value.  
 
4.1 Arithmetic Average 
Arithmetic mean is the simple average of rate of returns, equal to the sum of all the returns 
divided by the total number of periods. The Arithmetic mean measures the return of an 
investment that is held constant at the initial level. It can be calculated as follows: 
r A= N
r...rr N21 ++
 
where 
• r A       the arithmetic average; 
• r1, r2…r N  are the return in different periods; 
• N   is the number of periods. 
The average is used to forecast future rate of returns because of its unbiased property. 
However, for forecasts of cumulative returns over long horizons, the arithmetic average is 
inadequate. 
 
4 Risk and Return 
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4.2 Geometric Average 
As a descriptive measure of historical return, the geometric average provides an 
annualized measure of the proportional change in wealth that actually occurred over the 
time horizon being analyzed, as if the wealth grew at a constant rate of return equal to the 
geometric mean. In other words, geometric average measures the return of an investment 
that grows in each period at precisely the rate of return of the portfolio. 
The geometric mean of monthly returns can be expressed as follows: 
R= T t )R1( +∏  
where 
• П  th multiplication factor, terms of (1+R t) multiplies by each other; 
• R   geometric mean for the period of T months; 
• T   number of periods. 
 Arithmetic average and geometric average of monthly return for a period of time will 
differ from each other. The relationship between geometric mean return and arithmetic 
mean can be approximated with the following expression: 
R G= RA- 2
1
 σ
2
  
where 
• R G is the geometric mean return; 
• RA  is the arithmetic mean return; 
• σ
2
 is the variance of returns. 
This formula shows that the larger the volatility, the larger the difference between 
the arithmetic and geometric mean returns. Further, one can deduce from the above 
expression that the geometric mean return will always be smaller than the arithmetic 
average return, as long as returns are not constant.  
 
Jacquier, Kane, and Marcus (2005)show that  a proper measure for long horizons is a mix 
of a weighted average of  the arithmetic and geometric historical averages. 
 
4.3 Excess Return 
Investors evaluate returns of a mutual fund in comparison to some alternative investments. 
To be considered, a fund should meet some minimum hurdle, such as a return on a 
completely safe, liquid investment available at the time. This return is called risk-free rate 
of return, and usually is the rate on 90-day Treasury bills. A fund’s monthly return minus 
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the monthly risk-free rate is called the funds monthly excess return (r p-r f). Rate of return 
in excess of risk free rate is not the only alternative for comparing funds return with other 
investments. Domestic fund are compared to the market indices like OSEFX in Norway 
and S&P 500 which is the most widely used benchmark for diversified equity funds. For 
some type of funds, other benchmark may be more appropriated. 
 
4.4 Standard Deviation  
The basic measure of variability is the standard deviation (volatility), and it is computed as 
follows: 
STD=σ= ∑ − 2t )ARR(*T/1  
where 
• STD  the monthly standard deviation; 
• AR  the average monthly return; 
• T  the number of months in the period for which the standard deviation is 
being calculated. 
The monthly standard deviation can be annualized by multiplying it by the square root of 
12.  The standard deviation of excess returns over the risk-free rate is also used to measure 
a mutual fund’s risk. The standard deviation of the difference in returns between the fund 
and the appropriate bench mark index is also interesting for mutual fund companies. This 
enables them to measure how well their mangers are able to track the returns on some 
benchmark index related to the fund’s announced purpose. 
 
Standard deviation is sometimes criticized because investors do not dislike variability per 
se. As a consequence, a more recently developed measure is down side risk, which takes 
account of losses but not of gains. This can be calculated as follows (Simons, 1998): 
1. Count the number of months when the fund lost money or when excess returns 
were negative; 
2. Sum these negative excess returns; 
3. Divide the sum by the total number of months in the measurement period. 
 
While down side risk might reflect investor’s attitudes towards risk better than standard 
deviation, empirical evidence shows that those two measures are highly correlated, since 
the pattern of past performances of well-diversified portfolios tend to be symmetric and 
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thus the differences are not of great importance. There are several approaches how to 
measure risk, but unfortunately none of those can give a complete definition of risk. Or as 
former chairman of US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan postulates, “we will never have a 
perfect model of risk.” (Source: www.ft.com) 
 
4.5 Risk 
Fund’s returns are not the only interesting factor for investors, the risk taken to achieve 
those returns is also important. Risk often focuses on portfolio risk (mutual funds) as well 
as security risk. Risk is defined in different ways, one of those is the uncertainty of the 
expected return, and uncertainty is usually equated with variability. Investors demand and 
receive higher returns with increased variability. Risk can also be defined as possibility of 
suffering harm or loss, since we would not perceive variability that brings greater returns 
as a risk. 
 
In portfolio context, relevant risk is not an asset’s own risk, but its effect on portfolio 
systematic risk. Investors are not rewarded with a risk premium for bearing the 
unsystematic risk. They are just rewarded for assuming the risk that can not be eliminated 
through diversification. Empirical evidence shows that markets price securities based on a 
linear relationship between systematic risk and return. The roll of the unsystematic risk in 
the market pricing mechanism is small (Haslem, 2003). 
The total risk of a portfolio can be expressed as follows: 
=σ2i
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where 
• 
2
iσ The variance of the portfolio; 
 
• βi  Systematic risk of the portfolio; 
 
• 
2
Mσ The variance of the market portfolio; 
 
• 
2
εσ  The variance of the portfolio’s random error. 
 
 
This equation tells us that the total risk consists of two components with covariance of 
zero; 
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• Systematic variance ; 22 Mi σβ , due to the uncertainty of common macroeconomic 
factors; 
• Unsystematic variance; 2εσ , due to firm-specific uncertainty. 
The systematic variance depends on the sensitivity coefficients of the individual securities, 
and this part of the risk cannot be diversified no matter how many stocks are held. 
Systematic risk is caused by broad market factors impacting most securities such as 
monetary policy, inflation, tax policy, economic outlook and market outlook. The 
unsystematic risk component is attributable to firm-specific events such as financial 
strength, earnings outlook, management skill, brand recognition and competition. They are 
independent and have zero expected value. This is shown in the figure 4.1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Diversification and Risk 
 
 
As we can see, the unsystematic risk decreases by adding more stocks to a portfolio. 
Portfolio of 20 stocks will ensure diversifying away non-systematic risk and any next 
stock added to portfolio will not contribute significantly to decreasing systematic risk. 
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5.1 MPT and CAPM 
Nobel Prize laureate Harry Markowitz laid down the foundation of Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT) in 1952. He explained how individual investors build their portfolios by 
choosing appropriate positions in risky assets and risk free assets depending on 
correlations between returns on risky assets and investors’ attitude to risk. His work was 
followed by William Sharpe, John Lintner and Jan Mossin, who developed the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in the 60s. This model brought Markowitz’s ideas into 
general market model where prices are determined by demand and supply. 
 
MPT shows that it is possible to build a portfolio that is less volatile than any single stock 
in the actual portfolio. This is possible as long as the assets are less than perfectly 
correlated. Markowitz mathematically explained how it is possible to increase expected 
return and decrease total volatility of a portfolio by adding a stock that is more volatile 
than the portfolio. Thus, MPT introduced the possibilities that diversification brings to the 
reduction of total risk in a portfolio. 
 
The second contribution of MPT to modern finance is the explanation of how individual 
investors find optimal portfolios. Based on information about stock covariance, investors 
will identify efficient frontier of risky assets. This frontier consists of all the portfolios that 
offer the best risk-return combinations. Risk is measured as a portfolio’s standard 
deviation. If all investors use the same input to calculate efficient frontier of risky assets 
and a risk-free asset is available, all investors will hold the same optimal risky portfolio. 
Investors will differ in how much of their assets they will invest in the optimal risky 
portfolio and how much they will invest in the risk-free asset. These differences are caused 
by different risk aversion degrees in investors. This is graphically illustrated in figure 5.1, 
where the investor can “chose” return on his or her investments by increasing or 
decreasing risk. Investors’ optimal possibilities are represented by capital allocation line 
(CAL). 
5  Theoretical Background 
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Figure 5.1 Capital allocation line 
        
The CAPM is an equilibrium model for expected returns of assets, and relies on rather 
strict assumptions. The main assumptions are as follows: 
• there are many investors who are all price takers; 
• all investors plan to invest over the same time horizon; 
• there are no transaction costs or taxes; 
• investors can borrow and lend without limits at the same risk-free rate; 
• the market portfolio consist of all tradable assets; 
• all investors have homogenous  beliefs about the distribution of returns. 
 
These assumptions imply that investors are rational expected return-variance optimizers 
who use Markowitz portfolio selection model, and that all investors hold the same risky 
market portfolio. This portfolio coincides with the market portfolio when the market is in 
equilibrium. When asset market is in equilibrium – demand equals supply- the following 
relationship holds for all the assets in the market: 
))(()( fmpfp rrErrE −+= β  
where 
• )( prE     expected return on asset p; 
• 
 fr   risk free rate; 
• )( mrE   expected market return; 
• fm rrE −)(   expected market excess return over risk free return; 
• pβ  a measure of the relationship between asset’s expected rate of return and 
the market expected excess rate of return.  
 
Efficient frontier of risky 
assets 
CAL 
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pβ  is defined as:  
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where 2mσ   is variance of the market portfolio. 
 
The CAPM measures the risk of an asset by determining the asset’s contribution to the 
market portfolio risk. This contribution is measured by the asset’s beta, and thus beta 
governs the expected rate of return on the asset. The expected return–beta relationship can 
be expressed graphically as the security market line (SML) in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Security market line 
 
When the asset market is in equilibrium, the SML shows the expected return on an asset 
given its risk measured by beta.  
 
The CAPM has failed empirical testing, and there exist results testifying that also other 
factors, not just an asset’s beta, determine rate of return on a given asset. Fama and French 
(1993) introduced a three-factor model, where size and book-to-value factors are included. 
This model has showed better prediction ability than the single factor CAPM.  
 
5.2 The Single Factor Model 
Single factor model is a purely statistical model used to explain the behavior of asset 
returns. The model takes form of a simple bivariate linear regression model, which implies 
βp 
E(rp) 
E(rm) 
rf 
1 
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linear relationship between an unspecified factor and rate of return on an asset. This means 
that one factor will determine prices for all assets, though they may have different levels 
of sensitivity towards it.  Model is written mathematically in the following way: 
pppp Fbbr ε++= 110  
where 
• pr     is the rate of return on asset p; 
• pob  and 1pb  are parameters specific to asset p; 
• F      is the factor that determines asset price; 
• pε      is random unobserved error. 
The model assumes that E( pε )=0 and pε  is uncorrelated with the factor Cov ( pε , F)=0. 
The model lets the user determine the factor, like for instance the rate of growth of gross 
national product, changes in the rate of inflation, the unemployment rate, the rate of capital 
accumulation or the foreign exchange rate. The model does not seek to explain the 
behavior of the financial markets; it is rather a mean to generate testable hypothesis for 
exploring the evidence. 
 
This model can easily be turned into multifactor model by adding to the equation other 
factors that have linear relationships with rate of return on asset. 
pkpkpppp FbFbFbbr ε+++++= ...22110  
 
Sharpe substituted pr with ( )fp rr − and F with ( )fm rr − , where fr is risk free rate of 
return and mr is market rate of return, and arrived at the following type of single factor 
model. 
( ) ( ) pfmppfp rrbbrr ε+−+=− 10  
This equation is known as Sharpe’s single index model that is closely linked to the CAPM. 
It allows us to jump from the CAPM’s expected rate of return, which is unobservable, to 
the already observed rates of returns on assets and markets. 
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5.3 Performance Measures of Mutual funds 
The two major issues in any performance ranking are how to choose an appropriate 
benchmark for comparison and how to adjust a fund’s return for risk. We will use a 
number of performance measures, they all measure fund’s return relative to risk. However, 
they differ in how they define and measure risk and, consequently, in how they define risk 
adjusted performance (Simon, 1998). 
 
 Before we turn to more detailed analysis of performance measurements, we would like to 
give a short overview of the existing ratios. There exists 3 main types of ratios: 1) ones 
that will serve as guidance for undiversified investors namely Sharpe and M2 since they 
adjust the performance to total portfolio risk; 2) ones that are used by well diversified 
investors – Treynor measure and Jensen’s alpha, these measurements adjust rate of return 
for systematic risk; 3) Appraisal ratio is useful for investors who already hold a portfolio 
approximated to market portfolio, meaning they are exposed to 0 unsystematic risk; this 
ratio adjust returns for un-systematic risk.   
 
One can also divide the ratios by whether they measure absolute or relative performance. 
Sharpe and Treynor measure the absolute performance, since they don’t measure 
performance relative to market/benchmark portfolio. M2, Adjusted Jensen’s alpha and 
Appraisal ratio are relative performance measures, since they measure the portfolios 
excess return relative to that of market, and they give comparable values for different 
securities. 
 
5.3.1 The Sharpe ratio 
Sharpe ratio is also known as the reward- to-variability ratio. It was introduced by William 
Sharpe (1966), and it is a widely used risk-adjusted measure of performance. Sharpe's 
measure is calculated by dividing average portfolio excess returns over the sample period 
by the sample’s standard deviation of returns σ p: 
p
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where 
• r p   return on the portfolio; 
• r f    risk free rate of return; 
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σ p   the standard deviation of the portfolio. 
 The ratio captures the excess return generated by the portfolio in comparison to the 
amount of risk taken defined as standard deviation of portfolio. The more risk taken, the 
higher the return should be to compensate for the risk. Sine the Sharpe ratio evaluates a 
portfolio based on total risk, this ratio is appropriate for not-well diversified investments. 
This is due to the fact that non-systematic risk contained in the portfolios standard 
deviation, cannot be diversified away. The Sharpe ratio is based on the MPT, and the 
Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio is the slope of the capital market line. The reward-to- 
variability ratio for any asset is the slope of the capital allocation line. In figure 5.3 we can 
observe that portfolio A has a steeper curve and a higher Sharpe Ratio than the market 
portfolio. It indicates that funds manager of this portfolio has outperformed market. 
Portfolio B has a lower Sharp ratio, and has under performed the market (Simons,1998). 
 
Figure 5.3 The Sharp Ratio and Risk-Adjusted Performance 
 
E(R p) 
σ p  
r f 
M 
A
B 
SML 
CAL
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5.3.2 The Treynor Ratio 
This is a measure of portfolio excess return relative to its systematic risk, β p. It is also 
known as Treynor index or Treynor reward-to-volatility, and was developed by Treynor 
(1965). This measure is appropriate tool for well diversified investors since they are just 
interested in systematic part of the risk represented by β p. Treynor introduced the concept 
of the characteristic line whose slope measures the relationship between relative volatility 
of mutual funds returns β and the expected excess return (Haslem, 2003).  
The Treynor ratio is calculated as follows: 
p
fp
p
rr
T β
−
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where  
• T p  portfolio p’s Treynor ratio; 
• r p   return on the portfolio; 
• r f  risk free rate of return; 
• β p  the estimate of portfolio p’s beta. 
As the market beta is 1, Treynor’s index Tp for benchmark portfolio is (r m-r f) where r m 
is the market return. If Tp of the mutual fund portfolio is greater than (r m-r f) then the 
portfolio has out performed the market. The Treynor ratio can be defined by the slope of 
SML and the slope of portfolio’s characteristic line. The Treynor index of the market is 
the slope of the SML, and the Treynor measure of the portfolio is the slope of the 
characteristic line of the portfolio. As we can see in the figure 5.4, portfolio A is steeper 
than market (SML) and has a higher Treynor ratio. It indicates that A has done better than 
the market, while B has done worse.  
 31 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Treynor’s measure 
 
 
5.3.3 Jensen’s Alpha 
The Jensen (1968) Alpha or Jensen’s differential return is the difference between a 
portfolios actual return and its expected return given the portfolio’s systematic risk and 
that CAPM holds (Haslem, 2003). Jensen coefficient is not a relative value, but an 
absolute value. Significantly positive and negative alpha values are evidence of superior 
and inferior portfolio manager skills respectively. Higher manager skills represent the 
ability to select securities, low expense, and market timing. Alphas statistically not 
different from zero suggest performance equal to the market index on a risk-adjusted 
basis. A mutual fund’s Jensen Alpha is correctly interpreted only relative to the market 
index’s defined zero alpha. This is due to that fact that each asset’s beta normally differs in 
size, and it makes performance comparisons among assets difficult. 
The Jensen Alpha equation is computed as follows: 
( )[ ]pfmfppp rrrrJ β−+−=α=  
• J p  Jensen Alpha 
• r p   return on the portfolio 
• r f   risk free rate of return 
• r m   the return to the market portfolio 
• β p   the estimate of portfolio p’s beta 
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As we can see in the Figure 5.5, the SML shows the value of α A  and α B as the distance of 
portfolio A and B above and below the SML. 
 
 
Figure5.5 Jensen measure 
 
The regular Jensen Alpha may be correctly used to determine whether a particular mutual 
fund’s portfolio manger has generated abnormal returns as represented by positive alpha. 
To make such a comparison among funds, however, each fund’s Jensen Alpha must be 
divided by its beta to adjust its alpha for differences in systematic risk among the funds. 
With approximately same betas, the rank order of funds would be almost the same using 
Jensen Alpha and Adjusted Jensen Alpha ( Halem, 2003). 
The adjusted Jensen Alpha equation is computed as follows: 
Adj. J p = J p / β p  
Relationship between Sharp and Jensen ratio is: 
mpm
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Where ρ denotes the correlation coefficient between portfolio P and the market, and is less 
than 1. The Adjusted Jensen Alpha, Treynor and Sharpe ratios rank well diversified 
portfolios identically, but for less diversified portfolios, the Sharpe ratio may rank 
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portfolios differently than the other two ratios. This is because the Sharpe ratio measures 
total risk (standard deviation) while the others measures only systematic risk (beta).  
Micheal C. Jensen studied 115 open end mutual funds in the period 1945-1964, and the 
result was that the funds on average were not able to predict security prices well enough to 
outperform a buy-the-market-and hold policy. There was also very little evidence that any 
individual fund was able to significantly better than that expected from mere random 
chance ( Jensen, 1968). It is important to remember that he did not consider the question 
of diversification in his study.  Thus his results do not indicate that mutual funds are not 
providing a socially desirable service to investors.  
 
5.3.4 Modigliani and Modigliani (M2) 
The numerical value of Sharpe ratio is not easy to interpret as it gives absolute values, so a 
variant of Sharpe ratio was proposed by Graham and Harvey, and later by Modigliani. M 2   
measure focuses on total volatility as a measure of risk, but its risk-adjusted measure of 
performance has the easy interpretation of a differential return relative to the benchmark 
index (Bodi, et al, 2005). Since their measure is expressed in percentage, they believed 
that the average investor could more easily understand it. To understand the M 2 measure, 
one can imagine that a managed portfolio is mixed with a risk free security like T-bills so 
the complete portfolio has the same volatility as the market index. This measure equals the 
return the fund would have received if it had the same risk the market index had.  
 
M 2   measure is defined as follows: 
 
mmpmp
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p
2
  Modigliani and Modigliani measure; 
• r p*  risk adjusted return of the mixed portfolio, it has the same standard 
deviation as market; 
• r f   risk free rate of return; 
• r m  the return to the market portfolio; 
• Sp the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio; 
• S m the Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio; 
• σ m the standard deviation of the market . 
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As we can see from figure 5.6, the M 2 is the vertical distance between p* and M. One can 
move down the CAL corresponding to portfolio P until we reduce the standard deviation 
of the adjusted portfolio to match that of the market index. When the CAL is less steep 
than CML, P will have a negative M2. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Modigliani and Modigliani 
 
5.3.5 Appraisal Ratio 
This ratio measures abnormal return per unit of risk that in principle could be diversified 
away by holding a market index portfolio. It measures the quality of a fund’s investment 
picking ability. 
This ratio is also known as the theoretical information ratio too, because it focuses on the 
risk and return generated from the fund manager's ability to use information to deviate 
from the index in order to beat the market index. Appraisal ratio is a relative value and 
indicates how skilled the funds mangers have been to find mispriced stocks and how well 
they make use of the available information. 
Appraisal ratio is calculated by dividing the alpha of the portfolio to residual standard 
deviation in the industry.  
p
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• AR p  Appraisal ratio for portfolio p; 
• α p alpha of the fund; 
• σ ερ residual standard deviation= Non-systematic risk= Standard error. 
The appraisal ratio is a convenient measure if this is an active portfolio which is mixed 
with a passive index portfolio; the extra return α compensates the voluntary non-
systematic risk, σ ε. 
A good manager might have an IR of 0.5, while an exceptional manager might have an IR 
of 1.0. For any given level of residual risk, σ ε, the objective is to maximize investor 
utility, U, defined as a portfolio excess return less the disutility of portfolio residual risk. 
U= α-(λ σ2ε) 
Increases in portfolio excess return raise investor utility, and increase in portfolio residual 
risk decreases investor utility by a facto, λ. λ is the investor’s aversion to residual risk 
(regret aversion). 
By substituting α from IR equation investor’s utility can be written as a function of 
residual risk, investor risk aversion, and manager IR. 
U= (IR* σ ε) - (λ σ2ε) 
Investor utility will increase with an increase in IR and decline with increase in the 
investor’s level of residual risk aversion. The optimal level of residual risk, σ *ε , for a 
portfolio will also increase with IR and decrease with aversion to residual risk(Jacobs, 
Bruce I. and Levy, Kenneth N. (2000). 
 
5.4  Efficient Market Hypothesis  
 
The concept of Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) allows us to explore in greater depth 
the performance of Norwegian mutual funds in our sampling period. All of the asset 
management companies in our sample assume that all assets in the market are not 
correctly priced, and that one can earn extra return by understanding and exploiting these 
inefficiencies.  
 
The basic idea of the EMH is that stock prices already reflect all available information 
about the factors that will influence future prices. From this follows that stock prices are 
unpredictable, since we cannot predict “news” that will arrive and change the stock price. 
It is said that in efficient markets, stock prices follow a random walk with an upward 
tendency over time. Under EMH, the stock price of company X already reflects the 
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company’s predicted cash flows, management style, information about the industry in 
which it operates, its market position, its previous earnings etc. The price will change as 
new information arrives. For example, an announcement of a new contract will make the 
price rise, while an unexpected loss or capital write down will make the stock price 
decline.  
 
Efficient markets can prevail because there are people who gather the information that is 
relevant to the stock prices, and act on it by buying and selling stocks. Without them, 
markets would not be efficient. Market efficiency varies across markets and market 
segments. For example, developing country’s stock market may not be as well researched 
as developed country’s markets who have well-established culture of investments in 
stocks. In the same way, companies  not listed on stock exchange may receive less 
scrutiny than listed companies. It is reasonable to assume that the price of these less 
analyzed assets may not reflect all available information.  
 
It is common to distinguish between three versions of the EMH:  weak, semi strong, and 
strong. These versions differ by what is included in the term “all available information.” 
The weak-form hypothesis asserts that all the information derived by examining market 
trading data such as the history of past prices, trading volume, or short term interest is 
already incorporated in the price. Thus, it is useless to search for patterns in this 
information in order to predict future prices - it has already been done. The semi strong-
form hypothesis understands “all available information” to be publicly available 
information regarding a firm. Namely, the stock price reflects information such as the 
firm’s product line, management style, financial statements and strategy. The strong-form 
hypothesis states that stock prices reflect all information relevant to the firm, including 
information available only to company insiders. In most countries there are regulatory 
authorities that supervise that insiders do not misuse their privileged situation when it 
comes to firm relevant information by profiting selling stocks short or long. 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that for the most markets the semi strong hypothesis will be 
valid, since the strong-form hypothesis implies that there are illegal actions taking place in 
the market.  
 
Researchers have looked for performance persistence in the mutual fund industry. 
Existence of such persistence would imply that the weak form of EMH does not hold, and 
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that investors can predict portfolio performance by looking at past generated returns. At 
the same time, when trying to identify whether fund managers are able to time market and 
find underpriced stocks, the semi strong EMH form is tested. 
 
5.4.1 Performance Persistence – Weak Form of EMH  
Several major studies have tried to establish whether it is possible for investors to predict 
funds’ performance based on past performance and a strategy can be constructed to allow 
investors to earn excess returns by analyzing historical data. Even if persistence of 
performance is identified, there seems to be no feasible strategy that would allow investors 
to earn extra returns. This is due to management fees and the fact that this phenomenon 
seems to vary over time  
 
Most of the authors have come to the conclusion that performance persistence varies with 
the time period of the study. For example, Malkiel (1995) found that in the USA in the 
1970s efficient market theory seemed to prevail in terms that it was not possible to predict 
future fund performance based on its past performance. However, this was not true in the 
1980s and the late 1970s. Thus, it was possible for Malkiel to construct an investment 
strategy that earned excess returns in the 1980s, but this was not possible during the 1970s. 
He concluded that overall security markets are remarkably efficient, and investors will not 
gain excess return by investing in a fund that posses “hot hand”. By “hot hand” we 
understand a fund that can deliver higher than average returns over a longer period of 
time. 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that stocks exhibit a momentum property in which 
good or bad recent performance continues. They conclude that while the performance of 
individual stocks is highly unpredictable, portfolios of the best performing stocks in the 
recent past appear to outperform other stocks with enough reliability to offer profit 
opportunities. 
 
5.4.2 Market Timing and Stock Picking Ability – Semistrong Form of EMH 
Mutual fund managers are said to have market timing ability when they increase a fund’s 
exposure to the market index prior to market advances, and decrease exposure prior to 
market declines. In other words, fund managers who are able to anticipate market and 
predict bull and bear markets. Most existing studies find little evidence that fund managers 
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possess market timing ability, and on average mutual funds tend to show negative 
measures of market timing according to Bollen and Busse (2001).  
 
We must keep in mind that mutual fund manager’s ability to shift a fund’s allocation is 
constrained to varying degrees by the investment objectives of the fund. A manager 
constrained to holding equities might time the market by adjusting the correlation between 
a portfolio's return and the market return, as the market rises and falls.  In addition, market 
timing activity is hindered by restrictions on the use of leverage and derivatives placed on 
mutual funds by the regulatory authorities.  
 
It is common practice to divide portfolio performance into two main components, security 
selection and market timing. Several techniques are available to estimate the different 
components of portfolio performance. When direct observations of the managers’ market 
forecasts or portfolio composition is impossible, it one can relay on methods that require 
only the portfolio’s historic returns to evaluate managers’ market timing ability, namely 
1)Treynor and Mazuy (TM) and 2) Henriksson and Merton (HM).  
 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) developed the following regression to test for market timing 
ability. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) pfmpfmppfp rrrrrr εγβα +−+−+=− 2  
 
where 
• ( )fp rr −  is the excess return on a portfolio; 
• ( )fm rr −  is the excess return on the market; 
• pγ  measures market timing ability; 
• pε  is the regression model error term. 
If mutual funds increase (decrease) the portfolio’s exposure to the market prior to a market 
upturn (downturn), the portfolio’s return will be a convex function of the market’s return. 
This involves a positive pγ . 
 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) developed a different test of market timing, which is more 
appropriate when estimating market-timing possibilities of managers who are restricted in 
their actions and can choose to allocate assets between equity and cash.  
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where 
 
• ( )[ ]fmm rrr −= ,0max*  
Both methods are extensions of the CAPM, and assume that in each observation period the 
manager attempts to forecast whether the market will have positive or negative excess 
return. Both models also assume that managers act on their predictions either by choosing 
higher or lower level of systematic risk - beta - or shift from equities to cash or cash to 
equities.  
 
Both models assume there are two sources of performance, market timing and stock 
picking. By stock picking we understand the skill to find under priced stocks that will rise 
in value faster than the market. Since gamma in both models represents market timing 
ability, we are left with alpha as a measure for stock picking ability. The models assume 
that all managers have the same reaction function to the market forecasts; this can be a 
source of misleading results. If managers’ reaction to a predicted market downturn is 
switching from equities to cash, this activity will be best captured and measured by HM 
test, while it might not show up in TM test. Vice versa applies to fund managers who, 
faced with forecast of bear market, will switch to equities with negative correlation with 
market. Thus, it seems meaningful to discover managers’ reaction to predictions of market 
movements, and then chose the most appropriate test to check if the manager possesses 
market timing ability or not.  
 
Goetzmann et al. (2000) elaborated another widely used test for market timing, which is 
somewhat similar to the models already described. By estimating market timing 
coefficient instead of market excess return as an independent variable, Goetzmann uses 
monthly factor as proxies for the monthly payoffs of a successful market timer. 
 
Bollen and Busse (2001) show in their research that using daily returns when evaluating 
fund performance will give more precise estimates and sharper inference. They also 
suggest that mutual fund managers may possess more timing ability than previously 
documented., based on their analysis of fund performance using daily returns.  
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Most studies evaluating timing ability normally account for anomalies of Sharpe’s (1964) 
single-factor CAPM, like for instance Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market 
factors and Carhart's  (1997) momentum  factor. This can be done either by running 
multiple factor model, or by using stochastic discount factors like Chen and Knez (1996). 
This is necessary in order to avoid rewarding managers for simply exploiting these 
anomalies.  
 
Many studies point to a negative correlation between the market timing and selectivity 
measures of performance, like for instance Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986), Coggin 
(1993) and Goetzmann (2000). Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) suggest the following 
explanation for the negative correlation between alpha and gamma values: “If the funds 
being analyzed tend to hold assets that are less option-like than the average asset in the 
market proxy, then one would expect to see negative timing and positive selectivity 
measures. On the other hand, funds holding assets that are more option-like than the assets 
in the market proxy should show positive measures of market timing and negative 
measures of security selectivity.” They also put together a portfolio that by construction 
did not posses market timing ability, but that showed market timing ability using HM and 
TM tests, thus exposing the shortcomings of these tests. 
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6.1 Linear Regression Model 
Linear regression model allows us to evaluate relationship between a dependent variable 
and an independent variable(s). Linear regression equation can be expressed in the 
following way: 
  ttj
k
1j
j0t XY ε+β+β= ∑
=
 
where 
• Y t     dependent variable ; 
• Xt      independent variable(s) Xt = (Xt1, … Xtk); 
• β t       estimated parameter(s)  βt  =( βt1 … βtk); 
• єt      is residual or the observed error term. 
 
The model by calculations identifies linear relationship between the dependant variable 
and the independent variable(s). This relationship is described by βt. and it  is calculated by 
employing Ordinary Least Square method, where one estimates a regression line by 
minimizing the distance between the observed data and estimated line. This model gives 
us estimated parameters that ensure the least variance possible for observed error terms. R2 
is a measurement also called coefficient of determination and illustrates by how much the 
independent variable(s) explain movements in dependent variable. 
 
There are several underlying assumptions that must be fulfilled in order to ensure that 
OLS is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE): 
• cov(єt, єp) =0    error terms are stochastically independent of each other and they 
are uncorrelated; 
• var(єt) = σ2    variance of error terms is constant – heteroseskedasticity; 
• cov(єt, xt) =0   none of the observations x contains information about  є ; 
• єt ~ N(0, σ2)    error term is normaly distributed with  E(єt) = 0 and var(єt) = σ2. 
 
 
6 Methodology 
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6.2 Assessment and the Validity of the Model 
Coefficient of determination -R2 - is one of the measures we can use to evaluate how 
accurate is a regression model. R2 also measures what fraction of a fund’s volatility is 
attributable to market movements and is calculated as follows: 
2
2
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2
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=   
where 
• β2σ2M   the systematic variance 
• σ2    the sample’s total variance defined as β2σ2M + σ2(e) where σ2(e) is the 
unsystematic component. 
R2  may  also be expressed as follows: 
1R 2 = – 2
2 )e(
σ
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1- R2 is then the variance not explained by market movements. The coefficient of 
determination can be interpreted as a measurement of fund’s degree of diversification. A 
high R2 indicates that the mutual fund is well diversified and the non-systematic risk is 
low. 
Funds that have a different investments strategy than following benchmark index will have 
a low R2, and then deviation from the estimated regression line will be larger. It means the 
higher the value of R2, the lower the deviation from the estimated regression line. 
 
T-value is used to measure how valid the different estimated regression coefficients are. 
This is expressed mathematically as follows: 
 
T = (estimate-hypothesized value)/ Standard error of the estimate 
 
We assume H0= α is equal to zero/ β is equal to one while H1= α is different from zero/ β 
is different from one. We use critical t-values to reject or accept the null hypothesis. If the 
t-value is higher than the critical value, we can reject the null hypothesis. 
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6.3  Error Variable Diagnosing 
 
6.3.1 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation means that residuals are dependent on each other and correlated. This is 
not consistent with the requirement of independence of error variables. The Durbin 
Watson statistic is used to test for the presence of the first order correlation in the residuals 
of a regression equation. The test compares the residuals from time period t with residuals 
from time period t-1, and develops a statistics that measures the significance of the 
correlation between these successive comparisons. 
The formula for the statistic is as follows:  
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where 
• DW Durbin-Watson statistics 
• t
∧
ε   Regression’s residual 
• t  time period counter 
The statistics is used to test for both positive and negative correlation in the residuals. The 
statistics has a range from 0 to 4, and it depends on the number of observations and 
significance level to test whether first-order autocorrelation exists. The null hypothesis 
says that there is no significant correlation.  By using a table of critical values of DW, one 
can find values of DWL and DWU. The DW co-efficient determines whether the null 
hypothesis will be accepted or rejected. This is demonstrated in the table below: 
Interval Conclusion 
0  DWL Reject  H0: Positive autocorrelation 
DWL DW U Neither accept or reject 
DWU 4- DWU Accept H0: No autocorrelation 
4- DWU  4-DWL  Neither accept or reject 
4-DWL  4 Reject H0: Negative autocorrelation 
 
Otherwise a very simple method is used to test whether the requirement of independence 
of error variables is satisfied. If a DW test statistic lies between 1.5 and 2.5, then the 
requirement of independence will be maintained (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1989). 
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If there is evidence of auto correlation in residuals, the coefficient estimates are still 
unbiased, but they are inefficient, i.e. they are not blue, even at large sample sizes. 
Consequently, the standard error estimates could be wrong. In the case of positive serial 
correlation in the residuals, the OLS standard error estimates will be biased downwards 
relative to the true standard errors. That is, the OLS will understate their true variability. 
This would lead to an increase in the probability of type I error- that is, a tendency to 
reject the null hypothesis sometimes when it is correct. Furthermore, R2 is likely to be 
inflated relative to its ‘correct value’ if positive autocorrelation is present but ignored, 
since residual autocorrelation will lead to an underestimate of the true error variance 
(Brook, 2002). 
 
6.3.2 Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity means that the variance of the unobservable error, 2εσ , is not constant, 
and error variables are related (in expected value) to one or more of the explanatory 
variables. If the errors are Heteroskedasticity, OLS estimates will still give unbiased and 
therefore also consistent coefficient estimates, but they are no longer BLUE. Thus, 
inferences from the standard errors are likely to be misleading. If there is positive auto 
correlation (which is often the case in practice), the OLS slope standard errors will be 
underestimated and too low. Consequently, the estimated alpha and betas can be 
significant even when they actually are not supposed to (Brooks, 2002). This is 
demonstrated by the formula we used to find the t-statistic in section 6.2. 
T = ∧
∧
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There are many tests for heteroskedasticity, and we have used Breusch-Pagen test 
(Wooldrige, 2003). 
In this test, we assume that the ideal assumption of homoskedasticity holds, and we 
require the data to tell us otherwise. Because we are assuming that u has a zero conditional 
expectation, Var(εt |x)= E( εt 2|x),  so the null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity are as following: 
H0=Var(εt 2 |X1,X2, …,Xk )=σ2 
H1= Var(εt 2 |X1,X2, …,Xk) ≠  σ2 
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Dependent variable is the square of the error in the original regression equation, One 
observe the relationship between square of the errors and (X1,X2, …,Xk). In our model, we 
have just one independent variable namely the markets excess return ( )fm rr − . A simple 
approach is to assume a linear function: 
 
εt
 2
= δ0+ δ1x1+ δ2x2+…+ δkxk+ ν 
 
Then the null hypothesis is H0=δ1= δ2= ...= δk=0. Since we never know the actual error, we 
use the estimated error from the regression between square of the errors and (X1,X2, …,Xk).  
Then we can test the heteroskedasticity by using the F statistic which has an Fk,n-k-1 
distribution under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. This is expressed as follows: 
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 where 
• K  the number of regressors(independent variables) 
• n  the number of observations 
We can use either the p-values or critical values of F to decide whether heteroskedasticity 
exists in our sample or not. 
6.3.3 Normality 
Normality assumption for error variables is not critical for finding correct estimated 
parameters by OLS estimation. In a large sample like ours, a usual t-test will still be valid, 
and the consequences for different estimated parameters will also be small. 
 
6.4 Performance Persistence 
We look at the persistence of performance for the Norwegian equity funds at one year-
frequency in the period 1998-2008. We chose one year-frequency for the following 
reasons: “First, papers that find evidence of persistence generally do so for one-year 
horizons. Second, investors and fund managers tend to evaluate performance over annual 
periods. Third, tests of performance persistence require return availability for both ranking 
and evaluation periods. This leads to a look-ahead bias which can influence how much 
persistence is detected, ” Keswani, Stolin (2005). To measure performance persistence we 
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employ two methods: 1) persistence of rate of return and 2) persistence of portfolio’s 
alpha. The first method allows us to check for relative performance persistence among 
funds relative to each other. The second method allows us to look at portfolio performance 
persistence in absolute values when the fund performance is measured against a 
benchmark. 
 
6.4.1  Persistence of Rate of Return 
The methodology was developed by Goetzmann  and  Ibbotson  (1994). It was later 
applied by Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Malkiel (1995). The funds are ranked by 
one-year total returns. We use total returns that are not risk adjusted. 50 % of the funds, 
showing the highest returns, are labeled "Winners" (W), and the resting 50 % of the funds 
with the lowest returns are labeled "Losers"(L). We calculate the median for each year in 
order to divide the Norwegian equity funds in our sample in “Winners” and “Losers”. 
 Next, we look at the percentage of how many “Winners” from the period t-1 are classified 
as “Winners” in period t, and how many “Losers” are classified as “Winners”.  Thus, we 
can identify WW, WL, LW and LL pairs for all the years. We use a z-test to see whether 
the number of funds with persistent performance (that is, the number of Winner-Winner 
and Loser-Loser pairs) is significantly greater than what would be predicted by pure 
chance. 
We let p be the probability that a winning fund continues to be a winning fund in the 
following period, and assume independence across funds.  If there is no performance 
persistence, we would expect p to be equal 0.5. Meaning that half of the Winners from 
period t-1 would stay Winners in period t, and the other half would become Losers. We 
can provide evidence against persistence in winning funds by failing to reject the null 
hypothesis that p = 0.5.  Since the number of persistently winning funds is a random 
variable it will have a binomial distribution b(n, p). We denote the number of persistently 
winning funds with Y. Now we can construct a binomial test to see if the probability  p  of  
consistent  winning  is  greater  than  0,5. 
 
 When n is reasonably large  (different sources define reasonably large n as >20 up to >40, 
we are operating with n=18) and the probability is close to 0.5, one can use z test, to test 0 
hypothesis. Z value is calculated as follows:  
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• z  is a random variable N(0,1) 
• n  is the number of observation 
• p  is probability for Winner in t-1 period to stay Winner in t period. 
 
The number of observation equals 18 since we are just observing 50% of the funds that 
were winners in period t-1. We establish critical two tailed z value at |z|=1,96 at 5% 
significance level. For any smaller observed z values we cannot reject null hypothesis. 
 
6.4.2 Persistence of Portfolio’s Alpha 
To evaluate the persistence of portfolios alpha over two consecutive periods, we have 
employed the method used by Brown and Goetzmann (1995). 
 
In contrast to the relative performance evaluation when Winners were any fund doing 
better than the 50% of the sample in this case we define Winners as funds who have 
produced positive alphas. We calculate Jensen’s alphas for each year in the same way we 
have done to rank and compare funds.  We assume that the CAPM holds. 
 
For each period we identify Winner-Winner(WW), Winner-Loser(WL), Loser-Loser(LL) 
and Loser-Winner(LW) funds. For example, LW denotes a fund that in the year t-1 was 
labeled as a Loser (negative alpha), but in period t as a Winner with positive alpha. After 
having identified WW, WL, LL, LW pairs for each year, we calculate cross-product ratio 
(CPR) in the following way: 
)LWWL(
)LLWW(CPR
∗
∗
=  
This coefficient captures the fraction of funds that manifests persistence. We can derive 
null hypothesis of no-persistence when CPR =1 and performance in the first period is 
unrelated to the performance in the second period.  CPR  >1 indicates that there exist 
performance persistence while CRP <1 shows a reversal trend – if a fund achieved 
positive alpha in year t-1, it will more likely generate negative alpha in year t. We test null 
hypothesis that CPR=1 by using z-test where z value is calculated in the following way: 
)ln(
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Where z is N(0,1) and standard deviation of ln(CPR) is defined as follows:    
 
LW
1
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1
LL
1
WW
1
)CPRln( +++=σ  
With significance level at 5 % we establish critical two tailed z value at |z|=1,96 in order to 
reject null hypothesis of CRP=1. 
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7.1 Observation Period and Fund Types 
For our study we have chosen to look at the performance of Norwegian equity funds in 
period from April 1998 – March 2008 that are domiciled in Norway. This leaves out a 
couple of Norwegian equity funds registered in Luxembourg. 
 
We chose our observation period so that it would coincide with an investment time 
horizon. The rule of thumb and investment management companies suggest to their clients 
when investing in equity fund to consider a time horizon of at least 5 years due to volatile 
stock prices.  But when looking at Norwegian stock market we observe long down trends 
as from 2000 – 2003 and up trends the years after 2003 until 2007. Thus 5 years 
investment horizon for an investor will be too short, as it will capture mostly just the down 
or the upside of the stock markets.  
 
Funds are grouped according to their investment universes, meaning that all the funds in 
one group have more or less the same investment mandate. This allows for more reliable 
comparison among funds. For example it is meaningless to compare a fund investing in 
Norway with a fund investing in Baltic countries since we can reasonably expect that 
Norwegian stock market is more efficient than Baltic market thus earning positive alpha in 
Norway can not be compared to positive alpha in Baltic countries. 
 
7.2 Monthly Returns on Norwegian Equity Mutual Funds 
The rate of return calculation is based on end-of-period observations. It is measured using 
the closing net asset value (NAV fund share price excluding management, redemption fee 
or sales charge) of the fund on the last trading day of the month and the closing NAV on 
the last trading day of the previous month. Afterwards rate of return is adjusted for 
dividend distribution with underlying assumption that all dividends are reinvested. Rate of 
return is adjusted for corporate actions, like stock splits etc. and is calculated as follows: 
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where 
7 Data 
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• t,t0
r
 total return for period t0-t; 
• tP   adjusted price at time t; 
• dD   adjusted dividend at ex-date d. All dividends with ex-dates within the time 
frame( t0, t) are included; 
• 1dP −  adjusted price last inclusive dividend date. 
 
However the data do not reflect the real return gained by investors since it is not adjusted 
for purchase, selling and management fees nor taxes. It is not critical for our study to 
adjust rate of return for any of these factors. In our case it would be a complex task to 
adjust the returns for fees since they vary along with the amount of invested capital and 
when it comes to taxes, the laws have changed during our observation period. 
7.3  Market Portfolio Benchmark 
Grinblatt and Titman (1994) show that tests of performance are quite sensitive to the 
choice of  benchmark.  The role of a benchmark is important as it determines adjustment 
of rate of return for risk. Since we are using CAPM model for our estimates this 
benchmark is going to serve as the only proxy for estimating systematic risk vs fund 
specific risk. In empirical finance market indices serve as proxies for benchmarks. 
The index family can be divided into two groups: 
 
• All-Share Index and the Sector Indices  aim to reflect the overall state and changes in 
the level of the economy. There are no requirements for liquidity and stability thus it 
makes difficult to replicate these indices. 
• Benchmark Indices - this group is focused on investability of the constituent 
companies and periodic stability of the index composition, while still reflecting the 
population of stocks in order for the index to function as an investible benchmark for 
the investment community.  
 
In Norwegian market we find five indices of interest calculated by Oslo Børs. All of them 
are gross indices, meaning that all dividends are reinvested. 
1. OSEAX  All Shares Index includes all the shares traded in Oslo Børs. Index is 
adjusted for both corporate actions (share splits, mergers, demergers, new issues, stock 
redemptions and cancellations etc.) and dividends. Until February 2001 this index with 
slightly different security weights was known as TOTX  Total Index. 
 51 
2. OSEBX Benchmark Index includes shares that serve as representation of all the traded 
shares in Oslo Børs. OSEBX is revised semi-annually and the composition does not 
change for the period to secure stability with exception for corporate action 
adjustments. The index is adjusted for restrictions in free float and liquidity is a factor 
when including shares in index.  
3. OBX Index is a stock market index which lists the 25 most traded companies on the 
OSEBX index. 
4. OSEX Small Cap Index consists of the 10% lowest capitalised shares on Oslo Børs. 
5. OSEFX Oslo Børs Mutual Fund Index it is weight adjusted OSEBX in order to comply 
with the UCITS directive. The capping criteria: 
- The market value of securities issued by the same body may not exceed 10 per 
cent of the index total market value. 
- The market value of securities issued by the same body exceeding 5 per cent 
index weight must not combined exceed 40 per cent of the index’ total market 
value. 
- The index is adjusted for any capital redistribution. 
One of the drawbacks of benchmark indices is that they tend to portray survivorship bias 
since they include big and most liquid shares and companies that fall out of the favour 
with investors will drop out of the benchmark index portfolio, on the other hand 
benchmark indices may leave out small growth companies. 
 
Our choice falls on OSEFX index when performing most tests for two reasons (1) most of 
the funds we study give OSEFX as their reference index; (2) the large majority of the 
funds we study are UCITS funds that implies regulatory restrictions on the composition of 
portfolio, these restrictions are taken in consideration when constructing OSEFX. 
However, for some tests we use different ratios and it is specially indicated.  
We feel comfortable with this choice since our aim is not to answer the question whether 
the funds can beat the market, but to compare funds against each other, so it is logical to 
pick a benchmark that takes in consideration real world restrictions and that aims to be an 
investible portfolio with respect to liquidity and stability. 
Choice of benchmark affects the rate of total return, but has little or no effect of rankings 
when different benchmarks are employed as concludes Lehmand and Modest (1987). 
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7.4 Risk Free Rate of Return  
In practice there is no risk free rate of return since all investments involve some default 
risk. However in empirical studies the rate of return on bonds issued by state with maturity 
of 3 month is used as a proxy for risk free rate of return. 
 
Norwegian Central Bank issues short-term obligations and one of the reason it does so is 
to secure an efficient financial market by providing reference for risk free rate of return. In 
our case for Norwegian market we will use Oslo Børs calculated STX1 (3 month Treasury 
bills) index that has been calculated since 1995. The market for Norwegian government 
short term bonds can be regarded as illiquid, but Oslo Børs employ statistical techniques to 
compensate for this lack of liquidity. The tree month rate of return is used since it balances 
the impact of short term rate fluctuations in turbulent markets and expected inflation rate 
impact on longer term interest rates. 
 
However there is another possible option for risk free rate of return, namely NIBOR 
(Norwegian InterBank Offered Rate).  This rate indicates the cost of money for banks or 
the rate at which they lend to each other for different time periods. This rate is frequently 
used in empirical finance in smaller countries since it is more liquid than 3month 
government bonds. 
 
7.5 Survivorship Bias 
Data set we have employed in our study contains the past records of all the funds 
registered at Oslo Børs currently in existence. This creates the possibility of significant 
biases in the return figures calculated. High returns will tend to persist, since funds whose 
are unsuccessful will tend to drop out of the sample. It is extremely difficult to sell a 
mutual fund to the public that has a poor record. Companies that have several funds under 
management tend to merge the unsuccessful fund into more successful one thus burying 
the bad record. 
 
Malkiel in his 1995 study points out another common practice among asset management 
companies so called “incubator” funds strategy when company sets up 10 relatively small 
funds with different managers and waits until some of them have shown excess return over 
a short period of time 3 to 5 years. Then these successful funds are heavily marketed to 
public and rest of the initial funds is closed down together with their bad performance. In 
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this way only the well performing funds are to be found in publications of mutual fun 
returns. 
 
Malkiel showed that in period 1982-1991 there is a 1,5 % difference in the average yearly 
returns between general equity funds that have survived the whole period and all the funds 
that have existed each year. This is quite a substantial number and shows that one must 
take in consideration the survivorship bias. Malkiel (1995): “We conclude that analyses 
that systematically excluded nonsurviving  funds  will  significantly  overstate  the returns  
received  by mutual  fund  investors.”  
 
We don’t have information on situation in Norwegian funds market, but numerous fund 
mergers and the variation in fund numbers from year to year suggest that survivorship bias 
could be a problem for our data set. 
 
7.6 Presentation of Funds 
All information about the funds and management companies was collected from Oslo 
Stock Exchange, the websites of the companies and the statistics provided by Norwegian 
Mutual Fund Association. Table 7.1 shows a detailed overview of the selected 36 funds. 
The table includes management fee, subscription fee, redemption fee, risk profile, 
benchmark index, fund’s management company and its size in terms of capital under 
management. 
 
As we can see, DNB NOR Kapitalforvaltning and Storebrand Kapitalforvaltning are 
represented by seven and six funds each. Other investments companies are represented by 
1-5 of their funds. 
Funds in our sample use OSEFX, OSEBX, OBX and OSESX as their reference indices. 23 
of 36 funds use OSEFX, while OSEBX is used by 9 funds. The rest have OBX and 
OSESX as their reference indices. 
 
Subscription fee varies from 0.3-3%, while management fee varies between 0,7-2%. 
Redemption costs are between 0.1-1.5 %. Fourteen mutual funds have the maximum 
management fee of 2% and only Alfred Berg Norge + and PLUSS index have the lowest 
management fee of 0,7%. Alfred Berg Norge + has also the lowest subscription fee of 
0.3%. Index funds offer the lowest management fees since they do not incur costs of active 
 54 
management. On the basis of redemption costs, Post Banken Norge is the cheapest fund 
while Delphi Norge and Kaupthing Norge are the most expensive funds.  
 
Different fund management companies develop different risk scales to describe the risk, 
but one of the most used scales rank the risk from 1 to 10. The risk scale is described as 
below: 
1 to 3: Low risk 
4 to 5: Fair risk 
6 to 7: Moderate/High risk 
8 to 10: High risk 
 
As represented in the table, most Norwegian equity funds have a high risk profile, while 
just four funds claiming low risk. 
Fund name Reference index Subscription fee Redemption cost Management fee 
Risk 
profile 
ABN AMRO Kapitalforvaltning: NOK 23,5 billion       
ABN AMRO Aktiv OSEFX 3,0 % 0,5 % 1,5 % High 
ABN AMRO Kapital OSEFX 3,0 % 0,3 % 2,0 % High 
ABN AMRO Norge OSEFX 3,0 % 0,5 % 1,2 % Low 
ABN AMRO Norge + OSEFX 0,3 % 0,3 % 0,7 % 
Moderate/h
igh 
GAMBAK OSEFX 3,0 % 0,3 % 1,8 % High 
DNB NOR Kapitalforvaltning: NOK 104,5         
Postbanken Norge OSEBX 1,0 % 0,1 % 1,8 % High 
DnB NOR Norge (I) OSEBX 3,0 % 0,2 % 2,0 % High 
DnB NOR Norge (III) OSEBX 0,7 % 0,2 % 1,0 % High 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) OSEBX 3,0 % 0,2 % 2,0 % High 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) OSEBX 0,7 % 0,2 % 0,8 % High 
Avanse Norge (I) OSEFX 3,0 % 0,2 % 1,8 % High 
Avanse Norge (II) OSEFX 1,2 % 0,2 % 1,2 % High 
Nordea fondene: NOK 27 (1230)1       
Nordea avkastning OSEFX 2,9 % 0,2 % 2,0 % 
Moderate/hig
h 
Nordea Kapital OSEFX 1,0 % 0,2 % 1,0 % 
Moderate/Hi
gh 
Nordea Norge Verdi OSEFX 2,9 % 0,2 % 1,5 % 
Moderate/hig
h 
Nordea SMB OSESX 2,9 % 0,2 % 2,0 % High 
Nordea Vekst OSEFX 2,9 % 0,2 % 2,0 % high 
Storebrand Kapitalforvaltning: NOK 41         
Storebrand Aksje Innland OSEBX 0,3 % 0,3 % 0,6 % 
Moderate/hig
h 
Storebrand Norge OSEFX 3,0 % 0,5 % 1,5 % 
Moderate/ 
high 
Storebrand Vekst OSEBX 3,0 % 0,5 % 2,0 % High 
Storebrand Verdi OSEBX 3,0 % 0,5 % 2,0 % 
Moderate/ 
high 
Delphi Norge OSEFX 2,0 % 1,5 % 2,0 % High 
Delphi Vekst OSEFX 3,0 % 0,5 % 1%-4% High 
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Carnegi Kapitalforvaltning: NOK 9,5         
Carnegie Aksje Norge OSEFX 3,0 % 1,0 % 2,0 % Low 
Carnegie Norge Indeks OBX 3,0 % 1,0 % 0,8 % Low 
Danske Kapital AS: NOK 6         
Danske Fund Norge I OSEFX 2,0 % 0,3 % 2,0 % High 
Danske Fund Norge II OSEFX 1,5 % 0,3 % 1,5 % High 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst OSESX 2,0 % 0,3 % 1,7 % High 
Handelsbanken fondforvaltning: NOK 3         
Handelsbanken Norge OSEFX 3,0 % 0,5 % 2,0 % Moderate 
Kaupthing forvaltning As: NOK 0,07         
Kaupthing Norge OSEFX 2,0 % 1,5 % 2,0 % Moderate 
Warren Wicklund fondsforvaltning: NOK 2         
NB-Aksjefond OSEBX 3,0 % 1,0 % 2,0 % High 
ODIN forvaltning: NOK 38         
ODIN Norge OSEFX 3,0 % 0,5 % 2,0 % High 
Orkla Finans Fondsforvaltning: NOK 2         
Orkla Finans Investment Fund OSEFX 2,5 % 0,5 % 1,8 % High 
Fondsforvaltning AS: NOK 2         
PLUSS Aksje  OSEFX 0,5 % 0,5 % 1,2 % High 
PLUSS Index  OBX 0,5 % 0,5 % 0,7 % High 
PLUSS Markedsverdi  OSEFX 0,5 % 0,5 % 0,9 % High 
Table 7-1 Fund Presentation 
 
In our sample, there are funds from 12 different asset management companies.  Two of 
them are stand-alone asset management companies: WarrenWicklund Fondsforvaltning 
AS and Fondsforvaltning AS. These companies manage respectively 13 and 12 different 
types of mutual funds. 
 
The rest of the companies belong to bigger financial groups with the exception of Orkla 
Finans. Orkla Finans Forvaltning is a subsidiary of Orkla group, and started its business 
by managing Orkla group and other industrial companies assets. Now it has expanded its 
business to private customers as well, and concentrates on alternative investments such as 
private equity, real estate and hedge funds.  
 
The rest of the companies are subsidiaries of whether Norwegian or foreign larger 
financial groups composed of banking, asst management and/or insurance units. The 
sector during the last decade is characterized by consolidation and dynamism.  
 
DnB NOR Kapitalforvaltning AS is the biggest asset management company in Norway, 
and a subsidiary of DnB NOR group. It has around 100 fund managers and analysts placed 
in Norway, US, Sweden, UK and China. The company manages 13 Norwegian mutual 
funds and is the market leader in this niche.  
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Storebrand Kapitalforvaltning AS is a subsidiary of Storebrand group. Storebrand 
group in 2007 bought Swedish company SPP whose fund management division now is 
integrated in Storebrand Kapitalforvaltning AS. The group acquired Delphi 
Fondsforvaltning in 2002. It is worth noticing that Delphi in 1995 acquired Norse 
Forvaltning together with the fund, which is known today as Delphi Norge. 
 
Alfred Berg Kapitalforvaltning AS is a subsidiary of Fortis Investments and part of 
Fortis group, who acquired the company from ABN AMRO Asset Management – the 
previous owner- in 2007. Fortis Investments is one of the leading global asset managers in 
the world with 218 bn of Euros under management. Alfred Berg Kapitalforvaltning AS 
has developed through many mergers and acquisitions in the last decade. 
 
ODIN Forvaltning AS from 2000 became a 100% subsidiary of SpareBank 1 Gruppen 
AS and manages 11 equity funds. 
 
Nordea Fondene Norge AS stands out from the other companies by the fact that it has 
outsourced actual management of funds to Nordea Investment Management AB. Nordea 
Investment Management AB that is located in Luxembourg, and manages 157 billion EUR 
worth of assets. Nordea Group strategy is based on fund management consolidation to one 
platform in Luxembourg. The subsidiaries in different countries function more as 
distributors than actual fund managers.  
 
These five above described management companies, which belong to financial groups, 
have more than 20 bn NOK of assets under management each. We will not go more in 
detail for the remaining smaller companies, just mention that they are owned by 
respectively Svenska Handelsbanken group, Kaupthing Bank, Swedish Carnegie 
Investment Bank AB and Danske Bank group.   
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In this section we present the empirical results from the analysis. To get an overview of 
data material, we start by presenting descriptive statistics of mutual funds. 
 
8.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 8-1 the descriptive statistics of the funds analyzed is presented. 
Fond rp rp-rf σ(rp) Min rp Max rp 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 0,00698 0,00308 0,07443 -0,26016 0,21080 
Alfred Berg Aktiv (II) 0,00996   0,00606** 0,07043 -0,18446 0,17890 
Alfred Berg Norge* 0,00970   0,00581** 0,06605 -0,22379 0,13562 
Alfred Berg Norge +* 0,01023 0,00634 0,06640 -0,22239 0,13582 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK 0,01395   0,01005** 0,08391 -0,21957 0,28523 
DnB NOR Norge (I) 0,00830 0,00440 0,06632 -0,22237 0,13480 
DnB NOR Norge (III)* 0,00916  0,00526** 0,06623 -0,22230 0,13735 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 0,01078  0,00689** 0,07159 -0,22044 0,14840 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 0,00790 0,00400 0,06622 -0,22641 0,13751 
Nordea Avkastning 0,00735 0,00345 0,06482 -0,19704 0,13239 
Nordea Kapital 0,00815 0,00425 0,06597 -0,20724 0,13281 
Nordea Norge Verdi 0,00814 0,00424 0,06218 -0,20043 0,13158 
Nordea SMB 0,00967   0,00577** 0,07175 -0,18929 0,18256 
Nordea Vekst 0,00633 0,00243 0,06643 -0,22303 0,13073 
Storebrand Aksje Innland* 0,00911   0,00521** 0,06610 -0,23721 0,13070 
Storebrand Norge 0,00802 0,00412 0,06744 -0,23493 0,14331 
Storebrand Vekst 0,00655 0,00266 0,08462 -0,24570 0,36713 
Storebrand Verdi* 0,01213   0,00824** 0,06450 -0,23239 0,12420 
Avanse Norge (I) 0,00756 0,00367 0,06439 -0,20780 0,13564 
Avanse Norge (II) 0,00671 0,00281 0,06415 -0,22051 0,13704 
Carnegie Aksje Norge* 0,01082   0,00693** 0,06712 -0,20871 0,19804 
Carnegie Norge Indeks* 0,00888   0,00498** 0,06621 -0,23322 0,16860 
Danske Fund Norge I 0,00709 0,00319 0,06817 -0,28796 0,14057 
Danske Fund Norge II 0,00778 0,00388 0,06858 -0,29487 0,14617 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst 0,01054   0,00665** 0,07878 -0,20421 0,41770 
Delphi Norge 0,01163   0,00774** 0,08370 -0,24933 0,23014 
Delphi Vekst 0,01158   0,00769** 0,08013 -0,20045 0,25542 
Handelsbanken Norge 0,00771 0,00381 0,06552 -0,21567 0,14596 
Kaupthing Norge 0,01134   0,00744** 0,08342 -0,23814 0,36849 
NB-Aksjefond 0,00707 0,00317 0,06306 -0,23193 0,13764 
ODIN Norge 0,01158   0,00768** 0,07081 -0,21566 0,16823 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund 0,00791 0,00401 0,07113 -0,24866 0,13327 
PLUSS Aksje 0,00741 0,00352 0,06666 -0,25506 0,12900 
PLUSS Index 0,00943   0,00553** 0,06576 -0,24096 0,16894 
PLUSS Markedsverdi  0,00863 0,00473 0,06310 -0,23482 0,13425 
Postbanken Norge 0,00773 0,00383 0,06652 -0,22123 0,13609 
OSEFX 0,00866 0,00477 0,06736 -0,25416 0,14237 
*Funds with higher excess return and lower standard deviation than benchmark OSEFX                ** Funds with higher monthly 
average excess return than benchmark
 
  Table 8-1 Descriptive statistics of funds  
8 Results 
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As shown in Table 8-1, all of the funds have a positive monthly average excess return. 16 
of the funds generate a higher monthly average excess return than OSEFX, and 21 funds 
generate a lower standard deviation than the benchmark. 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK has the second highest standard deviation (0, 08391), but also 
shows the highest excess return (0,01005). Investors are exposed to a higher risk, but are 
compensated by higher returns. The same conclusion applies for Delphi Norge. This fund 
has the third highest standard deviation, as well as the third highest excess return This is 
not the case for Storebrand Verdi, which has the second highest return above risk free rate 
(0, 00824), but also the sixth lowest standard deviation (0,06450). Nordea Vekst shows the 
lowest average excess return (0,00243) as well as becoming a number 19 in funds with 
highest standard deviations. This may indicate a poor performance. Avanse Norge (II) has 
the third lowest excess return and the fourth lowest standard deviation. The results shows 
that the highest standard deviation is for Storebarnd Vekst (0,08462), and it is also the 
fund with the second lowest average excess return. This tells us that Storebrand Vekst is 
the fund with the poorest performance in our analysis. The fund with the lowest standard 
deviation during this period is Nordea Norge Verdi (0,06218), but this fund is also number 
21 when concerning excess reurn. This fund generates both low return above risk free rate 
and low risk.  
As we can see in the table, there are seven funds that both generate both higher excess 
return and lower standard deviation than the benchmark OSEFX.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
8.2 Error Diagnosing by Market Model 
 
Fund Autocorrelation: D-W Heteroskedasticity: B-P 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 1,6276 2,0303 
Alfred Berg Aktiv (II) 1,7909 1,1953 
Alfred Berg Norge 1,9006 0,7107 
Alfred Berg Norge + 2,0825 0,5546 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK 1,3912 1,5589 
DnB NOR Norge (I) 2,0622 0,1309 
DnB NOR Norge (III) 2,0976 0,2534 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 1,9281 4,4170 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 1,7674 0,9329 
Nordea Avkastning 1,7709  11,9365* 
Nordea Kapital 2,1918  8,6914* 
Nordea Norge Verdi 2,1424   4,1511** 
Nordea SMB 1,8656 1,8263 
Nordea Vekst 1,9856 1,3976 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 2,3205 0,0632 
Storebrand Norge 2,3246 2,6935 
Storebrand Vekst 1,5011 3,2836 
Storebrand Verdi 2,3247 0,1928 
Avanse Norge (I) 2,1589  4,7044** 
Avanse Norge (II) 1,8471 0,1239 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1,9782 0,0052 
Carnegie Norge Indeks 2,2526 0,7871 
Danske Fund Norge I 1,9746  4,8554** 
Danske Fund Norge II 1,9849  6,1333** 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst 1,3048 3,6899 
Delphi Norge 2,0941 0,1913 
Delphi Vekst 1,7696 0,3386 
Handelsbanken Norge 1,9660 0,0935 
Kaupthing Norge 1,4835 1,4334 
NB-Aksjefond 1,9849   6,1333** 
ODIN Norge 1,8770 0,0119 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund 1,6845 0,1551 
PLUSS Aksje  2,3619 1,3140 
PLUSS Index  2,2048 0,5387 
PLUSS Markedsverdi  2,1619 0,2180 
Postbanken Norge 2,0206 0,7810 
* 
Over upper 1% critical values of the F distribution
               
        ** 
Over upper 5% critical values of the F distribution 
Table 8-2 Error variable diagnosing by the market model 
 
The requirement of no correlation in error variables is satisfied when the values of Durbin- 
Watson test lies between DW u and 4- DW u. From table 8-2 we can see that the test 
statistic is less than the lower critical value for 3 funds: Alfred Berg  GAMBAK, Danske 
Fund, Norge Vekst and Kaupthing Norge. Hence, for these funds the null hypothesis of no 
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autocorrelation is rejected.  It can be concluded that the residuals in these funds appear to 
be positively correlated. This is not the case for the rest of the funds. 
Breusch-Pagens test for heteroskedasticity shows that the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is rejected for 7 of 36 funds. Two of the funds, Nordea avkastning and 
Nordea Kapital, obtain F- statistic that is higher the critical F- values at a 1% level. The 
following funds have heteroskedastic error variables at a 5% level: Nordea Norge Verdi, 
Avanse Norge (I), Danske Fund Norge I, Danske Fund Norge II and N-B Aksjefond.  For 
the rest of the funds, heteroskedasticity was not present. 
It is possible to deal with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation by using the Newey West 
method (HAC-correction), but we need a program called Eviews. We had to ignore this in 
our analysis, since we did not have access to this program. The consequences of ignoring 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are discussed in section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. 
 
 
 
8.2 Estimated Alpha and Beta Values for the Period and Their 
Statistical Characteristics  
Table 8-3 in next page shows the results from the regression using the single factor model. 
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1 Significantly different from 0 at 1%                                                                 *significantly different from 1 at 1% 
2 Significantly different from 0 at 5%    ** significantly different from 1 at 5% 
Table 8-3 Estimated alpha and beta values 
 
Fund αp T-value βp T-value2 R2 
Alfred Berg Aktiv -0,00170 -0,59766 1,00448 0,10596 0,82714 
Alfred Berg Aktiv (II) 0,00171 0,54053 0,91317 -1,85352 0,76305 
Alfred Berg Norge 0,00119 1,21707 0,96848   -2,17468** 0,97425 
Alfred Berg Norge + 0,00171 1,59120 0,97102 -1,82215 0,96931 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK 0,00497 1,24189 1,06589 1,11047 0,73226 
DnB NOR Norge (I) -0,00026 -0,35136 0,97772   -2,03018** 0,98535 
DnB NOR Norge (III) 0,00061 0,80961 0,97597   -2,14563** 0,98470 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 0,00196 0,20348 1,03339 1,46835 0,94595 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) -0,00059 -0,47458 0,96351   -1,97380 0,95837 
Nordea Avkastning -0,00106 -0,98017 0,94746  -3,26877* 0,96716 
Nordea Kapital -0,00035 -0,34438 0,96624   -2,21251** 0,97141 
Nordea Norge Verdi 0,00000 -0,00301 0,89146    -4,83291* 0,93032 
Nordea SMB 0,00138 0,41162 0,92073 -1,59193 0,74340 
Nordea Vekst -0,00213 -1,39393 0,95621 -1,93342 0,93791 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0,00058 0,65788 0,97142   -2,18025** 0,97897 
Storebrand Norge -0,00060 -0,64259 0,99061 -0,68050 0,97760 
Storebrand Vekst -0,00237 -0,56160 1,05481 0,87482 0,70607 
Storebrand Verdi 0,00395 1,94649 0,89960    -3,33602* 0,88334 
Avanse Norge (I) -0,00085 -0,97950 0,94686  -4,14300* 0,97880 
Avanse Norge (II) -0,00167 -1,72122 0,94118  -4,07676* 0,97302 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 0,00234 1,44504 0,96250 -1,56302 0,93170 
Carnegie Norge Indeks 0,00037 0,34109 0,96715 -2,04098 0,96835 
Danske Fund Norge I -0,00149 -0,98748 0,98140 -0,83213 0,94231 
Danske Fund Norge II -0,00082 -0,52423 0,98556 -0,62633 0,93934 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst 0,00218 0,50199 0,93793 -0,96529 0,64328 
Delphi Norge 0,00237 0,72945 1,12650  2,62699* 0,82263 
Delphi Vekst 0,00272 0,76448 1,04189 0,79434 0,76785 
Handelsbanken Norge -0,00075 -0,69215 0,95785  -2,61825* 0,96774 
Kaupthing Norge 0,00222 0,62230 1,09589 1,81270 0,78434 
NB-Aksjefond -0,00121 -0,52423 0,91912 -0,62633 0,96433 
ODIN Norge 0,00312 1,15320 0,95703 -1,07084 0,82816 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund -0,00086 -0,52935 1,02226 0,92052 0,93806 
PLUSS Aksje -0,00106 -0,74165 0,96111 -1,82650 0,94527 
PLUSS Index  0,00097 0,83209 0,95754   -2,46322** 0,96316 
PLUSS Markedsverdi  0,00033 0,34183 0,92348  -5,36705* 0,97264 
Postbanken Norge -0,00084 -1,10326 0,98049 -1,72473 0,98454 
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As shown in the table 8-3, 19 of 36 funds generate a positive alpha value, with Alfred 
Berg  GAMBAK (0, 00497) in first place followed by Storebrand Verdi (0, 00395) and 
ODIN Norge (0, 00312). It is noteworthy that no α values are significantly different from 
0, implying that we could not reject the null hypothesis of 0 abnormal returns. These 
results are not consistent with the investments strategy of these funds. This is consistent 
with Gjerde and Sættem (1991), since they could not find alpha values significantly 
different from zero when analyzing 14 funds. A positive alpha might tell us that funds 
managers have the ability to beat the market. It seems to be that these funds do not 
generate returns over a normal compensation for risk, since the alpha values in this 
analysis are not significantly different from zero.The three funds with lowest α values are 
Storebrand Vekst (-0, 00237), Nordea vekst(-0, 00213) and  Alfred Berg Aktiv (-0, 
00170). These funds also have a somewhat poorer result in our further analysis. 
 
Beta is a measure of a fund’s sensitivity to market movements. Thus, it is a measure of 
systematic risk, where the market’s beta equals 1. We noted that 28 beta estimates were 
below 1 and 8 above 1. This opposes Gjerde and Sættem (1991), whom came to the 
conclusion that the beta values of the funds analyzed were less than one. Delphi Norge has 
the highest beta value (1,12650). The funds with the second and third highest beta values 
are Kaupthing Norge (1,09589) and ALFRED BERG  GAMBAK (1,06589), respectively. 
6 funds had betas significantly different from one at 5% level, and 8 funds at 1% level. 
Nordea Norge Verdi had the lowest beta value of (0,89146) followed by Storebarnd Verdi 
(0,89960) and Alfred Berg Aktiv (II) (0,91317). These low beta values has to be seen in 
connection with R 2 and the market index used.  
 
There are 17 funds claiming to have higher risk than the market, despite the fact that the 
beta values of these funds are lower than the market. To some extent this could be 
explained by the fact that funds were restricted from borrowing in the capital markets, 
which narrowed the manager’s opportunity set of risky portfolios. Furthermore, only a 
minor proportion of the funds assets were held in fixed-income securities. 
 
As we can see in table 8-3, individual funds within the same management company have a 
remarkable similar risk profile measured by beta values. This result is consistent with 
Gjerde and Sættem (1991) studies. We cannot reject the hypothesis that related funds have 
equal beta coefficient. This result opposes the common claim that individual funds within 
the same company follows different investment policies.  
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R2 tell us how much of the variance of the funds’ excess return which is explained by the 
variance of the market index. A high R2   indicates low unsystematic risk and consequently 
a well diversified portfolio. In this analysis, R2 varies from 64,33% to 98,53%. Overall, 
this coefficient is high in our sample.  Hence, for nearly all of the funds systematic risk is 
the main element of total risk. Danske Fund Norge Vekst obtained the lowest R2 value 
(64,33%), and this fund obtains also a low beta.  This fund use OSESX as the reference 
index, and these results are consistent with their strategy to actively deviate from the 
index.  DnB  NOR Norge(I) and DnB NOR Norge (III)  were the funds with highest 
systematic risk, with R2  values of 98,53% and 98,47%  respectively. DnB NOR Norge (I) 
is a fund of funds with DnB NOR Norge (IV). The high R-squared of these DnB NOR 
Funds corresponds to their investments strategy of reflecting the market portfolio as much 
as possible. 
 
8.3  Performance Evaluation of Funds 
In this part, we will present the performance evaluation of the funds, based on the different 
measures explained in the theory section. Table 8-4 in next page, shows the results of 
calculating four measures and ranking all the funds based on each measure. The number 
beside each measure indicates ranking postition. Fund with best performance is ranked as 
number1, and number 36 shows the poorest performance. 
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* Higher performance than market index 
Table8-4 Ranking based on different performance measures with OSEFX as market 
index 
 
Fund Sharp Rank Treynor Rank 
Jensen Alpha 
Rank M2 Rank 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 0,0414 34 0,0031 33 -0,0017 34 -0,002 34 
Alfred Berg Aktiv (II)  0,0860* 11  0,0066* 10 0,0017 10 0,001 11 
Alfred Berg Norge  0,0879* 10  0,0060* 13 0,0012 13 0,0012 10 
Alfred Berg Norge +  0,0954* 7  0,0065* 11 0,0017 11 0,0017 7 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK  0,1198* 2  0,0094* 1 0,0050 1 0,0033 2 
DnB NOR Norge (I) 0,0664 20 0,0045 20 -0,0003 20 -0,0003 20 
DnB NOR Norge (III)  0,0795* 15  0,0054* 15 0,0006 15 0,0006 15 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I)  0,0962* 5  0,0067* 9 0,0020 9 0,0017 5 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 0,0604 23 0,0042 23 -0,0006 22 -0,0007 23 
Nordea Avkastning 0,0533 29 0,0036 30 -0,0011 29 -0,0012 29 
Nordea Kapital 0,0644 21 0,0044 21 -0,0004 21 -0,0004 21 
Nordea Norge Verdi 0,0683 19 0,0048 19 0,0000 19 -0,0002 19 
Nordea SMB  0,0804* 14  0,0063* 12 0,0014 12 0,0007 14 
Nordea Vekst 0,0366 35 0,0025 35 -0,0021 36 -0,0023 35 
Storebrand Aksje Innland  0,0789* 16  0,0054* 16 0,0006 16 0,0005 16 
Storebrand Norge 0,0611 22 0,0042 22 -0,0006 23 -0,0006 22 
Storebrand Vekst 0,0314 36 0,0025 36 -0,0024 35 -0,0027 36 
Storebrand Verdi  0,1277* 1  0,0092* 2 0,0040 2 0,0038 1 
Avanse Norge (I) 0,0569 26 0,0039 28 -0,0008 27 -0,0009 26 
Avanse Norge (II) 0,0438 33 0,003 34 -0,0017 33 -0,0018 33 
Carnegie Aksje Norge  0,1032* 4  0,0072* 5 0,0023 6 0,0022 4 
Carnegie Norge Indeks  0,0752* 17  0,0051* 17 0,0004 17 0,0003 17 
Danske Fund Norge I 0,0468 32 0,0033 32 -0,0015 32 -0,0016 32 
Danske Fund Norge II 0,0566 27 0,0039 25 -0,0008 25 -0,001 27 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst  0,0844* 12  0,0071* 6 0,0022 8 0,0009 12 
Delphi Norge  0,0925* 8  0,0069* 7 0,0024 5 0,0015 8 
Delphi Vekst  0,0959* 6  0,0074* 4 0,0027 4 0,0017 6 
Handelsbanken Norge 0,0582 24 0,0040 24 -0,0008 24 -0,0008 24 
Kaupthing Norge  0,0892* 9  0,0068* 8 0,0022 7 0,0012 9 
NB-Aksjefond 0,0503 31 0,0035 31 -0,0012 31 -0,0014 31 
ODIN Norge  0,1085* 3  0,008* 3 0,0031 3 0,0025 3 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund 0,0564 28 0,0039 26 -0,0009 28 -0,001 28 
PLUSS Aksje (Fondsforval) 0,0528 30 0,0037 29 -0,0011 30 -0,0012 30 
PLUSS Index (Fondsforvaltn)  0,0841* 13  0,0058* 14 0,0010 14 0,0009 13 
PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforv)  0,0750* 18  0,0051* 18 0,0003 18 0,0003 18 
Postbanken Norge 0,0576 25 0,0039 27 -0,0008 26 -0,0009 25 
OSEFX 0,0708   0,0048           
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8.3.1 Performance Evaluation Based on The Sharpe Measure 
As we can see in the table, there are 18 funds which have outperformed the market index 
OSEFX. The Sharpe ratio for the market index was 0, 070764. There are no negative 
Sharpe ratio, which indicate that these funds have done better than the interest rate market 
during the period analyzed. 
Ranking based upon the Sharpe ratio give us the following best three funds: 
1. Storebrand Verdi 
2. Alfred Berg GAMBAK 
3. Odin Norge. 
The funds ranked poorest according to the Sharpe ratio are: 
34. Alfred Berg Aktiv 
35. Nordea Vekst 
36. Storebrand Vekst. 
8.3.2 Performance Evaluation Based on The Treynor Ratio 
The ranking based on the Treynor ratio differ somewhat from the Sharpe ratio. This can be 
due to the differing standard deviation of funds in some periods. The ranking based on 
these two measures are identical for 15 of the funds, while for the rest of the funds the 
difference is rather small. An exception is Danske Fund Norge Vekst which is ranked as 
number 6 by the Treynor ration, but as number 12 by the Sharpe ratio. 18 funds have a 
higher Treynor ratio than the market index. These funds are identical to the ones 
outperforming the market index when using the Sharpe ratio. 
In addition, we have ranked the funds using the Adjusted Alpha. The results of the ranking 
were exactly the same as for the Treynor ratio. Since Jensen’s Alpha is a more commonly 
used measure, we only included Jensen’s Alpha.  
The three best ranked funds based upon the Treynor ratio are as follows: 
1. Alfred Berg GAMBAK 
2. Storebarnd Verdi 
3. Odin Norge. 
The following funds were ranked poorest: 
34. Avanse Norge (ii) 
35. Nordea vekst 
36. Storebrand vekst. 
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8.3.3 Performance Evaluation Based on The Jensen’s Alpha 
Ranking of the funds on the basis of the Jensen’s alpha is rather similar to the Treynor 
ratio. 21 funds have the exact same ranking as the one derived from the Treynor ratio. As 
can be seen, 17 of the funds have a negative alpha; therefore they do not have the ability to 
generate risk adjusted excess return over the risk free rate. 
The best funds when considering Jensen’s alpha are: 
1. Alfred Berg GAMBAK 
2. Storebrand Verdi 
3. Odin Norge 
The poorest ranked funds are: 
34. Alfred Berg Aktiv 
35. Storebrand Vekst 
36. Nordea Vekst 
 
8.3.4 Performance Evaluation Based on Modigliani and Modigliani 
Ranking based on the Modigliani and Modigliani measure (M2) gives an identical ranking 
as the Sharpe ratio. This is because the M2 is a linear function of the Sharpe ratio. There 
are 18 funds with positive M2 values, and these are the same funds that outperformed the 
market when using the Sharpe and Treynor ratio. 
 Funds ranked best according to the M2 measure are the following: 
1. Storebrand Verdi 
2. Alfred Berg GAMBAK 
3. Odin Norge 
The funds ranked lowest are: 
34. Alfred Berg Aktiv 
35. Nordea vekst 
36. Storebrand vekst 
 
8.3.5 Summary Ranking Based on all Performance Measures 
Table 8-5 in next page, shows the ranking based on the results of all measures, and we find 
a similarity between them.   
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Fund Sharp Treynor Adj. 
Alpha 
Jensen 
Alpha 
M 2 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 34 33 33 34 34 
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 11 10 10 10 11 
Alfred Berg Norge 10 13 13 13 10 
Alfred Berg Norge + 7 11 11 11 7 
 GAMBAK 2 1 1 1 2 
DnB NOR Norge (I) 20 20 20 20 20 
DnB NOR Norge (III) 15 15 15 15 15 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 5 9 9 9 5 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 23 23 23 22 23 
Nordea Avkastning 29 30 30 29 29 
Nordea Kapital 21 21 21 21 21 
Nordea Norge Verdi 19 19 19 19 19 
Nordea SMB 14 12 12 12 14 
Nordea Vekst 35 35 35 36 35 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 16 16 16 16 16 
Storebrand Norge 22 22 22 23 22 
Storebrand Vekst 36 36 36 35 36 
Storebrand Verdi 1 2 2 2 1 
Avanse Norge (I) 26 28 28 27 26 
Avanse Norge (II) 33 34 34 33 33 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 4 5 5 6 4 
Carnegie Norge Indeks 17 17 17 17 17 
Danske Fund Norge I 32 32 32 32 32 
Danske Fund Norge II 27 25 25 25 27 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst 12 6 6 8 12 
Delphi Norge 8 7 7 5 8 
Delphi Vekst 6 4 4 4 6 
Handelsbanken Norge 24 24 24 24 24 
Kaupthing Norge 9 8 8 7 9 
NB-Aksjefond 31 31 31 31 31 
ODIN Norge 3 3 3 3 3 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund 28 26 26 28 28 
PLUSS Aksje  30 29 29 30 30 
PLUSS Index  13 14 14 14 13 
PLUSS Markedsverdi  18 18 18 18 18 
Postbanken Norge 25 27 27 26 25 
Table 8-5 Summary ranking based on all performance measures 
 
 
The Sharpe and M2 measure give identical ranking. This is also the case for the adjusted 
Jensen’s Alpha and the Treynor ratio. Alfred Berg GAMBAK, ODIN Norge and 
Storebrand Verdi are the three best funds according to all of the measures. However, there 
are some minor differences concerning which fund ranked best. A reason for the good 
performance of these funds could be the active management. The Alfred Berg GAMBAK 
fund manager’s objective is to achieve the best possible risk-adjusted return through an 
actively managed portfolio of investing in Norwegian companies, which are unique in 
their market. This fund does not follow any direct reference index. Storebrand Verdi’s best 
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performance could be explained bye the strategy of investing in shipping, offshore and 
finance industry, which is characterized by a relative stable and predictable earnings.The 
three funds with poorest performance according to the Sharpe ratio, Jensen’s Alpha and 
the M2 measure, are Alfred Berg Aktiv, Nordea vekst and Storebarnd Vekst. The Treynor 
ratio and the adjusted Jensen’s Alpha, have Avanse Norge (II) ranked poorest, instead of 
Alfred Berg Aktiv.  As mentioned before, we have used OSEFX as a market index for all 
of the funds, even several of the funds use OSEBX as their benchmark. All these three 
best and worst funds use OSEFX as their reference index, with the exception of 
Storebarnd Vekst which use OSEBX. One cannot argue that the reference index is the 
reason for the poor performance of Alfred berg Aktive and Nordea vekst.  
 
8.3.6 Performance Evaluation Based on Appraisal Ratio 
The estimated values for the Appraisal Ratio (AR), with OSEFX as a market index, are 
presented in table 8-6 in.  When calculating the AR, it is essential to use each fund’s 
associated reference index as the market index to obtain a correct result. Funds with the 
highest AR values are ranked as the best. A positive (negative) AR value indicates that the 
fund has done better (worse) than its market index.  
 
Fund AR Rank 
Alfred Berg Aktiv -0,0547 15 
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 0,0495 9 
Alfred Berg Norge 0,1114 4 
Alfred Berg Norge + 0,1456 1 
 GAMBAK 0,1137 3 
Nordea Avkastning -0,0897 20 
Nordea Kapital -0,0315 12 
Nordea Norge Verdi -0,0003 11 
Nordea Vekst -0,1276 22 
Storebrand Norge -0,0588 16 
Avanse Norge (I) -0,0896 19 
Avanse Norge (II) -0,1575 23 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 0,1322 2 
Danske Fund Norge I -0,0904 21 
Danske Fund Norge II -0,0480 13 
Delphi Norge 0,0668 7 
Delphi Vekst 0,0700 6 
Handelsbanken Norge -0,0633 17 
Kaupthing Norge 0,0570 8 
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Fund AR Rank 
ODIN Norge 0,1055 5 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund -0,0484 14 
PLUSS Aksje -0,0679 18 
PLUSS Markedsverdi 0,0313 10 
Table 8-6 Estimated Appraisal Ratio for funds with OSEFX as market index 
 
The ranking based on AR differ from the other measures. As shown in table X, 13 of the 
23 funds have a negative Appraisal Ratio The best funds according to the AR are Alfred 
Berg Norge +, Carnegie Aksje Norge and Alfred Berg  GAMBAK, respectively. The table 
also shows that Danske Fund Norge I, Nordea Vekst and Avanse Norge (II) are the funds 
with poorest performance. The two latter funds were also the worst using the Treynor ratio 
and the adjusted Jensen’s Alpha. 
 
There are 9 funds which use OSEBX as market index, and they are ranked in table 8-7. As 
shown in the table, 5 funds have a negative AR. The best fund is Storebrand Verdi, and 
Postbanken Norge is the fund with the poorest performance. Storebrand Verdi has also 
performed very well according to the other previous measures.  
 
 
Fund AR Rank 
DnB NOR Norge (I) -0,0595 7 
DnB NOR Norge (III) 0,0652 3 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 0,1065 2 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) -0,0482 5 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0,0480 4 
Storebrand Vekst -0,0498 6 
Storebrand Verdi 0,1952 1 
NB-Aksjefond -0,0918 8 
Postbanken Norge -0,1466 9 
Table 8-7 Estimated Appraisal ratio for funds with OSEBX as market index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
Table 8-8 and 8-9 in next page shows the funds using OSESX and OBX as their market 
index. All the estimated Appraisal values are negative.  
 
 
 
Fund AR Rank 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst -0,0767 1 
Nordea SMB -0,1602 2 
Table 8-8 Estimated Appraisal ratio for funds with OSESX as market index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fund AR Rank 
Pluss Index  -0,03269 1 
Carnegie Norge Indeks -0,15408 2 
Table 8-9 Estimated Appraisal ratios for funds with OBX as market index 
 
 
In table8-10, the ranking of the funds is presented, by using OSEFX as the market index 
for all of the funds. In addition to present Appraisal Ratio for funds with each their 
respective market index in separate tables, we have collected all the funds in one table 
whether they use OSEFX, OSEBX, OBX or OSESX. In the left side of 8-10, AR ratio is 
calculated by using each fund’s respective market index and in the right side by using 
OSEFX as the market index for all of the funds. We have presented both to show the 
importance of using correct market index when calculating AR ratio. 
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Fund AR   Rank AR with 
OSEFX  
Rank2 
ABN AMRO Aktiv -0,0547 22 -0,0547 26 
ABN AMRO Kapital 0,0495 12 0,0495 14 
ABN AMRO Norge 0,1114 5 0,1114 6 
ABN AMRO Norge + 0,1456 2 0,1456 2 
GAMBAK 0,1137 4 0,1137 5 
DnB NOR Norge (I) -0,0595 24 -0,0322 21 
DnB NOR Norge (III) 0,0652 10 0,0741 9 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 0,1065 6 0,1170 4 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) -0,0482 19 -0,0434 22 
Nordea Avkastning -0,0897 29 -0,0897 31 
Nordea Kapital -0,0315 16 -0,0315 20 
Nordea Norge Verdi -0,0003 15 -0,0003 19 
Nordea SMB -0,1602 36 0,0377 16 
Nordea Vekst -0,1276 32 -0,1276 35 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0,0480 13 0,0602 12 
Storebrand Norge -0,0588 23 -0,0588 27 
Storebrand Vekst -0,0498 21 -0,0514 25 
Storebrand Verdi 0,1952 1 0,1781 1 
Avanse Norge (I) -0,0896 28 -0,0896 30 
Avanse Norge (II) -0,1575 35 -0,1575 36 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 0,1322 3 0,1322 3 
Carnegie Norge Indeks -0,1541 34 0,0312 18 
Danske Fund Norge I -0,0904 30 -0,0904 23 
Danske Fund Norge II -0,0480 18 -0,0480 32 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst -0,0767 27 0,0459 15 
Delphi Norge 0,0668 9 0,0668 11 
Delphi Vekst 0,0700 8 0,0700 10 
Handelsbanken Norge -0,0633 25 -0,0633 28 
Kaupthing Norge 0,0570 11 0,0570 13 
NB-Aksjefond -0,0918 31 -0,1009 33 
ODIN Norge 0,1055 7 0,1055 7 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund -0,0484 20 -0,0484 24 
PLUSS Aksje  -0,0679 26 -0,0679 29 
PLUSS Index  -0,0327 17 0,0761 8 
PLUSS Markedsverdi 0,0313 14 0,0313 17 
Postbanken Norge -0,1466 33 -0,1010 34 
Table 8-10 Estimated Appraisal ratio for funds with their own market index and AR 
ratio for all funds with OSEFX as market index 
 
As we can see, those two rank differently but the three best funds are the same. Funds with 
best performance are as following: Storebrand Verdi, Alfred Berg Norge+ and Carnegie 
Aksje Norge. As shown in the table, the fund with poorest performance is Nordea SMB 
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when we use each funds respective market index, but this fund comes to a sixteenths place 
according to AR in the right side of table.  
8.4 Performance Persistence  
 
In this section we present results from the two performance persistence tests. Our findings 
are summarized in Table 8-11. 
 Persistence of unadjusted rate of return Persistence of Jensens’ alpha 
       
  
WW, WL, LL  
and LW Pairs 
   
WW, WL, LL  
and LW Pairs 
  
  Winners Losers WW Z-value Winners Losers CPR Z-value 
1999         
Winners 4 14 22,22 % -1,17851 4 2 1,333333 0,305133 
Losers 14 4   18 12   
  2000         
Winners 7 11 38,89 % -0,4714 7 15 0,466667 -1,083 
Losers 11 7   7 7   
 2001         
Winners 12 6 66,67 % 0,707107 6 8 2 0,960453 
Losers 6 12   6 16   
2002         
Winners 12 6 66,67 % 0,707107 7 5 1,96 0,938376 
Losers 6 12   10 14   
2003         
Winners 6 12 33,33 % -0,70711 5 12 0,902778 -0,1409 
Losers 12 6   6 13   
    2004         
Winners 9 9 50,00 % 0 6 5 1,8 0,80486 
Losers 9 9   10 15   
   2005         
Winners 9 9 50,00 % 0 4 12 1 0 
Losers 9 9   5 15   
2006         
Winners 11 7 61,11 % 0,471405 5 4 1,5625 0,576154 
Loosers 7 11   12 15   
2007         
Winners 8 10 44,44 % -0,2357 11 6 0,34375 -1,32103 
Loosers 10 8   16 3   
1999-2007 Average    Average  
Winers 78 84 48,15 %  55 69 0,974235  
Losers 84 78   90 110   
Table 8-11 Performance Persistence Tests 
8.4.1 Persistence of Rate of Return 
 
With our small sampling material we cannot reject the null hypothesis for any year 
(|z|=1,96 for 5 % significance level). This means that we cannot conclude that there exists 
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any performance persistence among Norwegian equity funds. Nevertheless, we can 
observe that the percentage of repeated Winners vary greatly from year to year, and as 
many as 78% of the 1999 Winners turned into Losers in year 2000.  
 
This reversal trend is observed in 4 out of 9 years. The general trend during the period 
seems to be that if a fund outperforms 50 % of it’s peers in period t-1, it is more likely that 
in period t the fund will find itself in the lower half when it comes to performance. This is 
because, on average, only 48,15% of the Winners tend to stay Winners also the following 
year. However, these observations have no statistical significance. 
8.4.2 Persistence of Portfolio’s Alpha 
 
This test shows similar results as persistence of rate of return test. As we recall CPR ratio 
equal to 1 means that 50 % of last periods Winners stay Winners in the preceding period, 
while CPR<1 indicates that more than 50 % of the last years Winners have turned into the 
current years Losers. 
None of the years shows statistically significant positive or negative performance 
persistence. 
 
Both relative and absolute tests show that there is no performance persistence in 
Norwegian equity funds’ performance during the period 1998-2007. As several studies 
indicate that the results vary depending on the period studied, we cannot generalize these 
conclusions to any other time period. 
 
It is worth noting that our results are exposed to bias in our data set, since we have looked 
only at funds that have been in existence during the whole observation period, leaving out 
funds that were started after 1998 and those that ceased to exist before March 2008. 
However, our findings are consistent with studies that search for performance persistence 
in mutual fond industry in Italy (Casarin et al (2002)), Danmark (Christensen (2005)) and 
Britain (Keswani, Stolin (2005)).  
 
8.5 Market Timing 
In this subsection we present results from Treynor, Mazuy (TM) and Henriksson, Merton 
(HM) market timing tests for Norwegian equity funds. 
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Table 8-12 displays results from TM equation where we use OSEAX index as a 
benchmark. Estimates marked with dark blue are statistically significant with 5% 
confidence interval. 
Table 8-12 Treynor Mazuy Market Timing Model 
               
 
Fund αp     T-value Gamma T-value R2 
Alfred Berg Aktiv -0,00289 -0,84781 -0,1748 -0,39185 0,830181 
Alfred Berg Aktiv (II) -0,00058 -0,15379 0,126662 0,256908 0,768456 
Alfred Berg Norge -0,00061 -0,37027 0,009357 0,043542 0,950071 
Alfred Berg Norge + -0,00023 -0,13631 0,03847 0,175432 0,948539 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK 0,001298 0,273526 0,383456 0,616778 0,740661 
DnB NOR Norge (I) -0,0021 -1,51005 0,013153 0,072163 0,964354 
DnB NOR Norge (III) -0,00125 -0,88598 0,020047 0,108186 0,963049 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) -0,00032 -0,13529 0,104516 0,339928 0,912828 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) -0,00181 -0,99809 -0,13043 -0,54956 0,939471 
Nordea Avkastning -0,00319 -1,63546 0,110113 0,43105 0,926811 
Nordea Kapital -0,00216 -1,13468 0,024579 0,098508 0,932567 
Nordea Norge Verdi -0,00201 -0,81567 0,118361 0,367033 0,873267 
Nordea SMB -0,00512 -1,32787 1,117373 2,213692 0,767419 
Nordea Vekst -0,00384 -1,70068 0,000825 0,002789 0,9066 
Storebrand Aksje Innland -0,00072 -0,50672 -0,11489 -0,61408 0,962198 
Storebrand Norge -0,00158 -0,85626 -0,18406 -0,76384 0,93978 
Storebrand Vekst -0,00591 -1,11153 0,397417 0,570883 0,679856 
Storebrand Verdi 0,002235 1,074664 -0,02415 -0,08864 0,915651 
Avanse Norge (I) -0,00209 -1,17443 -0,1 -0,42866 0,938153 
Avanse Norge (II) -0,00272 -1,52005 -0,1474 -0,62801 0,937005 
Carnegie Aksje Norge -0,00128 -0,60367 0,436312 1,577041 0,919864 
Carnegie Norge Indeks -0,0013 -0,87283 -0,03247 -0,16668 0,959096 
Danske Fund Norge I -0,00116 -0,51089 -0,49475 -1,67074 0,910687 
Danske Fund Norge II -0,00052 -0,22679 -0,4875 -1,61668 0,908462 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst -0,00054 -0,10574 0,210198 0,312345 0,65526 
Delphi Norge -0,00314 -0,75001 0,836456 1,523358 0,796543 
Delphi Vekst -0,00307 -0,6876 0,934339 1,598147 0,748318 
Handelsbanken Norge -0,00185 -1,09336 -0,15468 -0,69886 0,946207 
Kaupthing Norge -0,00391 -0,91862 0,96603 1,731976 0,788498 
NB-Aksjefond -0,00094 -0,45529 -0,43727 -1,61035 0,912385 
ODIN Norge 0,000282 0,083815 0,253984 0,576205 0,817117 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund -0,00126 -0,50921 -0,33419 -1,02915 0,901468 
PLUSS Aksje -0,00201 -0,87789 -0,17628 -0,5885 0,904419 
PLUSS Index  2,75E-05 0,01655 -0,19673 -0,90251 0,948038 
PLUSS Markedsverdi  -0,00018 -0,09603 -0,25942 -1,03913 0,926 
Postbanken Norge -0,00313 -2,23681 0,117206 0,640151 0,964262 
    
Average: 0 ,883432 
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Just 4 funds show positive alpha - PLUSS Index, ODIN Norge, Storebrand Verdi and 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK. Theses funds according to TM model demonstrate the ability to 
identify and include in their portfolios underpriced stocks, rest of the 36 funds show 
negative stock picking ability. Postbanken Norge fund exhibits negative alpha and is the 
only fund in the sample with statistically significant alpha value. 
 
16 funds show negative gamma value. These funds have maid wrong predictions about 
market movements and acted on them thus dragging down their portfolio performance. 
The remaining 20 funds exhibit positive market timing ability. The best market timer 
according to TM model is Nordea SMB fund with the highest gamma and it is also the 
only one that is statistically significant.  However if we use OSEBX as a benchmark for 
gamma estimation we get gamma equal to 0,88660 that is not statistically significant, 
while OSEFX index gives us significant value of 0,937680, which is lower than the value 
we obtain with OSEAX index exhibited in the table above 1,117373. 
 
Next table 8-13 summarizes results from Henriksson and Merton test with OSEAX index 
as a market proxy. 
Fund αp     T-value Gamma T-value R2 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 5,9E-05 0,012339 -0,14435 -0,95642 0,831277 
Alfred Berg Aktiv (II) 0,001399 0,264109 -0,05672 -0,33903 0,768553 
Alfred Berg Norge 0,000957 0,415599 -0,05983 -0,82257 0,950357 
Alfred Berg Norge + 0,001319 0,415599 -0,05436 -0,82257 0,94876 
Alfred Berg GAMBAK 0,002811 0,419885 0,003849 0,018211 0,739819 
DnB NOR Norge (I) -0,00059 -0,30359 -0,057 -0,92468 0,964611 
DnB NOR Norge (III) 0,000115 0,057824 -0,05036 -0,80284 0,963248 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 0,000837 0,253258 -0,02807 -0,26895 0,912796 
DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 0,000357 0,140883 -0,10642 -1,32926 0,940217 
Nordea Avkastning -0,00209 -0,76045 -0,02502 -0,28847 0,926746 
Nordea Kapital -0,00034 -0,12638 -0,06747 -0,79873 0,932927 
Nordea Norge Verdi -0,0007 -0,20108 -0,03192 -0,29154 0,873213 
Nordea SMB -0,00956 -1,75871 0,358458 2,087517 0,766379 
Nordea Vekst -0,00317 -0,99612 -0,0263 -0,2621 0,906655 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 0,001043 0,522283 -0,08823 -1,39869 0,9627 
Storebrand Norge 0,001094 0,426423 -0,13503 -1,6661 0,940882 
Storebrand Vekst -0,00562 -0,74987 0,054107 0,228711 0,679108 
Storebrand Verdi 0,001975 0,674495 0,006217 0,067222 0,915648 
Avanse Norge (I) -1E-05 -0,0041 -0,09811 -1,24618 0,938867 
Avanse Norge (II) -0,00084 -0,33611 -0,09801 -1,23611 0,937608 
Carnegie Aksje Norge -0,00165 -0,5526 0,086765 0,917532 0,918745 
Carnegie Norge Indeks -0,00011 -0,05189 -0,05201 -0,78855 0,959302 
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Fund αp     T-value Gamma T-value R2 
Danske Fund Norge I 0,000988 0,310202 -0,16554 -1,64631 0,910627 
Danske Fund Norge II 0,001316 0,405165 -0,15237 -1,48617 0,908151 
Danske Fund Norge Vekst 0,001702 0,235215 -0,05343 -0,23386 0,655134 
Delphi Norge -0,00433 -0,72982 0,184386 0,983675 0,79421 
Delphi Vekst -0,00317 -0,50106 0,158047 0,789961 0,744188 
Handelsbanken Norge 0,00058 0,245834 -0,12068 -1,62078 0,947169 
Kaupthing Norge -0,00623 -1,03434 0,25023 1,31468 0,786233 
NB-Aksjefond 0,001962 0,67652 -0,186 -2,03093 0,913493 
ODIN Norge 0,002444 0,515149 -0,04293 -0,28665 0,816727 
Orkla Finans Investment Fund 0,001879 0,541862 -0,17825 -1,62801 0,902779 
PLUSS Aksje -0,00086 -0,26591 -0,07422 -0,73058 0,904572 
PLUSS Index  0,001663 0,712474 -0,09655 -1,30991 0,948432 
PLUSS Markedsverdi  0,001999 0,748806 -0,12832 -1,52211 0,926768 
Postbanken Norge -0,0021 -1,06726 -0,02084 -0,33482 0,964171 
Table 8-13 Henriksson Merton Market Timing Model 
 
45 % (16 funds) of funds exhibit negative alpha value, while 55 % show positive stock 
picking ability. However none of these values are statistically significant. 
8 funds according to HM model did have positive market timing ability, the rest show 
negative gamma value and negative market timing ability. HM test gives us 2 statistically 
significant gamma values. Nordea SMB shows positive market timing ability, while NB-
Aksjefond shows significant negative market timing ability. 
 
TM test finds less funds with positive stock picking abilities than HM, respectively 4 and 
20 funds show positive alpha values, at the same time TM test finds more funds with 
positive market timing abilities than HM test, respectively 20 vs 8.  However TM and HM 
tests gives us just 2 values each that are statistically significant. Both identify Nordea 
SMB fond as a successful market timer with significant gamma values. While both tests 
shows negative stock picking abilities of Postbanken Norge only TM test gives it a 
statistically significant value. As well both test show negative market timing ability of 
NB-Aksjefond, but only HM test assigns it statistically significant value. These results 
coincide with study performed for Danish mutual funds where Christensen (2005) finds 2 
funds with significant market timing ability out of 47. 
 
TM and HM test when using OSAX as a benchmark, do not show the negative correlation 
between alpha and gamma values that many market timing studies have exhibited. 
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However when using OSEFX index as a benchmark for alpha and gamma estimates in TM 
and HM tests we did find negative correlation between market timing and stock picking 
ability. Furthermore different benchmark indexes influence TM and HM tests 
significantly. While using OSEFX index for TM test we found that almost 40 % of funds 
exhibited positive statistically significant market timing ability and 11% of funds showed 
statistically significant negative stock picking ability. We found similar results for HM test 
that exhibited negative stock picking abilities and positive market timing abilities.  These 
findings coincide with those of Gjerde og Sættem (1991).  
 
When estimating gamma and alpha values with OSEBX index we got results from TM test 
that 14% of funds can time market and just one fund exhibited negative significant stock 
picking ability. 
 
It seems that the closer our benchmark is to the “real” market portfolio the less 
pronounced market and stock picking abilities we find using TM and HM tests.  OSEAX 
index is the less restricting of the three indices we have used, while OSEBX is adjusted so 
that it could be copied by investors in real life, while OSEFX restricts the investment 
possibilities further as to comply with the restrictions fund managers face. 
 
Probably more of the sample funds would show market timing abilities and they would be 
stronger if we would use daily data, since that would coincide better with timing frequency 
of managers. Our data also do not satisfy the assumptions made by the models that all fund 
managers in the sample pursue market timing strategy and that they all have the same 
reaction function to market forecasts.  And we can guess that some of our funds do not 
comply with the assumptions of heteroskedasticity and normal distributions for error terms 
that are made by regression model thus distorting our results. 
 
We conclude that market timing ability for Norwegian equity funds is rare as only one 
fund out of 36 exhibited positive significant positive market timing ability by TM and HM 
tests. 
 
8.6 Consolidation and Performance 
 
As we mention earlier mutual funds industry has undergone consolidation process during 
the last decade. In this section we look at weather mergers and acquisitions of funds and 
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their management companies have influenced the performance of individual funds. It is 
argued that fund managers loosing the ownership of the company will perform worse due 
to less incentive for making their outmost effort. It has been publicly discussed that the 
continuous merger and acquisition process in the industry causes changing management 
environment for fund managers thus affecting their performance.  
 
We will examine the performance of funds managed by 4 stand-alone asset management 
companies that were bought by larger financial groups. We will also look at the case when 
4 capital management companies owned by bigger financial institutions were merged into 
one. 
 
We proceed by evaluating the individual fund performance 3 years before and 3 years 
after the acquisition using M2 and adjusted Jensen’s alpha. We have to dismiss Sharpe, 
Treynor and Jensen’s alpha measures, as they are not suited to comparing funds 
performances across time periods. 
 
In the table below we give short information on the acquisitions that we investigate. 
Company Name Acquisition 
year 
Comments Funds in our sample 
Stand-alone companies bought by financial groups 
Odin Forvaltning  January 2000 In 1996 SpareBank 1 Gruppen AS 
bought 51 % of the company with the 
right to buy the rest of company until 
2000. 
Odin Norge 
Gambak 
Fondsforvaltning 
December 
2003 
After tow years of underperformance 
bought by ABN AMRO  group that 
already owned 34 % of the company 
before. 
Alfred Berg Aktiv II   
Alfred Berg Gambak 
Delhpi 
Fondsforvaltning 
July 2002 Bought by Storebrand group. In 1995 
Delphi Fondsforvaltning acquired 
Norse Forvaltning. 
Delphi Norge 
Delphi Veks  
Industrifinans 
Fondsforvaltning 
June 2000 Bought by ABN AMRO group, 
merged with Alfred Berg Forvaltning 
that was owned by ABN AMRO. 
Alfred Berg Norge  
Alfred Berg Norge +  
Alfred Berg Aktiv    
Merger between asset management companies owned by financial groups 
Avanse Forvaltning June 2004 Norwegian oldest equity fund started 
in 1966. Three companies were 
merged into DnB NOR 
Kapitalforvaltning (Avanse 
Forvaltning, DnB Investor og 
Gjensidige NOR Kapitalforvaltning). 
Merger was a part of Gjensidige NOR 
and  DnB group merger process. 
Avanse Norge (I)  
Avanse Norge (II)  
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Table 8-14 shows the results for the performance measure estimates before and after 
acquisitions 
 
M2  before M2 after Adj. Jensen 
Alpha before 
Adj. Jensen 
Alpha after 
ODIN Norge -0,0021 0,0050 -0,0015 0,0050 
     
GAMBAK -0,0028 -0,0045 -0,0039 -0,0011 
Alfred Berg Aktiv (II) 0,0011 -0,0059 0,0005 -0,0039 
     
Delphi Norge 0,0069 -0,0008 0,0070 0,0007 
Delphi Vekst 0,0077 -0,0031 0,0081 -0,0021 
     
Alfred Berg Aktiv -0,0011 -0,0029 -0,0007 -0,0040 
     
Alfred Berg Norge -0,0020 -0,0002 -0,0020 -0,0004 
Alfred Berg Norge + -0,0011 0,0001 -0,0010 -0,0001 
     
Avanse Norge (I) -0,0022 -0,0002 -0,0023 0,0000 
Avanse Norge (II) -0,0033 0,0009 -0,0034 0,0012 
Table 8-14 Performance Before and After Acquisition 
 
The results are varying from one company to another, and do not give us a clear-cut 
answer. 
 
For Avanse Forvaltning both portfolio performance measures improved for both funds in 
our sample. This result does not surprise us as Avanse Forvaltning had troubles with its 
performance while the company was undergoing closer integration process with 
Gjensideige NOR Kapitalforvaltning and its CEO Arnfinn Kirkenes resigned at the end of 
2002. In this case reshuffling cards saved the long-standing brand name, and improved the 
portfolio performances. 
 
When it comes to acquisitions of stand-alone asset management companies bought by 
larger financial groups, we find that two companies did improve their results while the 
performance of other two deteriorated. 
 
Funds of Delphi Fondsforvaltning and Gambak Fondsforvaltning performed worse after 
acquisition. Both funds of Delphi Fondsforvaltning performed worse according to all 
measures after being bought by Storebrand group. Similar results are also observed for 
Gambak Fondsforvaltning.  According to Jensens alpha GAMBAK fund did perform 
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slightly better after acquisition while it became a worse investment alternative for non-
diversified clients as suggested by declining M2. 
Acquisitions of Odin Forvaltning and Industrifinans Fondsforvaltning in 2000 were 
successful strategies in terms of improved performance. The only exception here is the 
fund Alfred Berg Aktiv, which performed worse after acquisition. 
 
It is not unusual that after an acquisition or merger, companies merge their funds keeping 
the best track record or the best brand name and image. Some of the Industrifinans 
Fondsforvaltnings funds were merged with Alfred Berg Fondsforvaltning and Oslo 
Fondsforvaltning funds in 2001 after ABN AMRO acquired them. The same happened in 
merger where Avanse Forvaltning participated. This factor plays a role for our results as 
the rates of returns of the funds we are analyzing might be biased. 
 
However, we observe the following patterns in our sample; changes in ownership do have 
an influence on the companies’ performance, and it seems to have the same effect 
(positive or negative) on all the acquired company’s funds. 
 
 
8.7 Big vs Small Managers 
In this subsection we are going to investigate whether bigger management companies do 
better than smaller companies when it comes to performance of Norwegian equity funds. 
We divided 12 asset management companies present in our sample into 2 groups, namely 
“Big Managers” and “Small Managers”. We define “Big Managers” as a company whose 
assets under management exceed 15 billion NOK, the rest of the companies fall under 
category “Small Managers”.  
 
Afterwards we use the fund performance measurements to assign each of the fund points, 
ranging from min 3 points and max 108 points. The points are calculated as follows:  we 
rank funds from 1 to 36 according to Sharpe, Treynor measure and appraisal ratio and then 
sum all the 3 ranking’s for each of the fund. So the best fund could theoretically get 3 
(1+1+1) points if it was the best according to all three measurements while 108 
(36+36+36) would be a point sum if the fund came out worst in all performance 
measurements, none of our funds received the highest or lowest possible point sum. 
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Table 8-15 exhibits the average sum of points each management company got for their 
funds. Table also indicates sum of points for the best and the worst fund of the specific 
management company as well as information of how many funds of a company are 
contained in our sample and how much assets they have under management. 
 
  
Number 
of 
Funds 
Points 
Worst 
Fund 
Points  
Best 
Fund 
Points 
on 
Average 
 NOK  
billion 
Under 
Management 
Big Managers           
DnB NOR Kapitalforvaltning  7 102 20 65 104,5 
Storebrand Kapitalforvaltning   6 93 4 42 41 
Alfred Berg Kapitalforvaltning 5 89 7 35 23,5 
Nordea Fondene Norge  5 102 53 73 27 
ODIN Forvalting  1   13 38 
Average of the group:     45,6  
Small Managers           
Handelsbanken Fondforvaltning  1   73 3 
Fondsforvaltning  3 85 50 60 2 
Kaupthing Forvaltning  1   28 0,07 
WarrenWicklund 
Fondsforvaltning  1   93 2 
Carnegie Kapitalforvaltning  2 68 12 40 9,5 
Danske Capital Norge  3 94 45 70 6 
Orkla Finans Forvaltning 1   74 2 
Average of the group:        62,6    
Table 8-15 
On average Big Managers did better than Small Managers in time period 1998-2008. 
However the best and the worst performing fund is to be found in the Big Manager group. 
The gap is quite wide at 17 points, that means roughly 8 (17/3) places ranking difference 
between Big and Small Managers funds on average. It can also be explained as Big 
Managers’ funds performing better than 60 % of the market on average while Small 
Managers’ funds do better than just 40% of the funds in sample (100% - 46/108x100 ≈ 60 
% and 100%-63/108x100 ≈ 40%).  
 
We restrain ourselves from generalizing these results to other periods and other sectors 
since in the Small Manager group we have just 12 funds while Big Managers group has 24 
funds. 
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It is worth noting that many funds have changed their owners, thus it could be possible 
that Big Managers have bought up smaller companies with good results. The other factor 
we would like to draw attention to is that bigger companies have more resources for in 
house analysis. They can afford more and better analysts that can specialize in narrower 
geographical markets or industries than a smaller company. The same goes for fund 
managers. These aspects could be part of explanation why bigger managers did on average 
better than smaller ones. 
 
Our two stand-alone companies Fondsforvaltning and Warren Wicklund did quite badly 
by getting 60 and 93 points, meaning that they have performed worse than market/sample 
average.   
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Based on the results from the empirical analysis, we shortly summarize our main findings. 
 
First, we look at results we arrived at by evaluating equity funds based on portfolio 
performance measures. 
All of the funds in this analysis achieved a positive monthly average excess return above 
the risk free rate, but there are only 18 funds which had outperformed the market index 
OSEFX based on the Sharpe and the Treynor ratio. There were no negative Sharpe ratio, 
which indicate that these funds have done better than the interest rate market during the 
period analyzed. Ranking of the funds on the basis of the Jensen’s alpha shows that17 of 
the funds have a negative alpha, they do therefore not have the ability to generate risk 
adjusted excess return over the risk free rate. It is noteworthy that no α values are 
significantly different from 0, implying that we could not reject the null hypothesis of 0 
abnormal returns. It seems to be that these funds do not generate returns over a normal 
compensation for risk, since non of the alpha values in this analysis are not significantly 
different from zero. 
There were 14 funds that had betas significantly different from one in our analysis.  Many 
funds did not have the same risk profile as they claim. There are 17 funds claiming to have 
higher risk than the market, despite the fact that the beta values of these funds are lower 
than the market. We observed also that individual funds within the same management 
company have a remarkable similar risk profile measured by beta values. The coefficient 
of determination (R2) is high in our sample.  Hence, for nearly all of the funds systematic 
risk is the main element of total risk . 
 The funds with the best performance according to the majority of the performance 
measures were Alfred Berg GAMBAK, ODIN Norge and Storebrand Verdi. The funds 
ranked poorest were the following: Alfred Berg Aktiv, Nordea Vekst and Storebrand 
Vekst. Hence, the performance measures show a high positive correlation to each other. 
We find no performance persistence in Norwegian equity funds’ returns during the period 
1998-2007. However, we observe statistically insignificant reverse pattern over the period, 
meaning that funds that do good one year have higher than 50% chances of doing bad the 
next year. These results are strongly exposed to the bias in our data sample since we are 
looking only at funds that have been in existence during the whole observation period, 
9 Conclusions 
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leaving out funds that were started after 1998 and those that ceased to exist before March 
2008. 
 
Market timing ability for Norwegian equity funds is rare. Only one fund out of 36 
exhibited significant positive market timing ability by both tests that were employed to test 
for stock picking and market timing abilities. We find that the results are extremely 
sensitive to chosen benchmark. However we conclude that Efficient Market Hypothesis 
holds for Norwegian stock markets. 
 
We find that Norwegian equity funds of companies whose assets under management 
exceed 15 bn NOK performed better than 60% of the market on average, while funds of 
companies who manage assets worth less than 15 bn NOK averagely did better than 40% 
of market in our observation period. 
 
For the five acquisition and merger cases we examined we find the following trend: 
changes in ownership do have an influence on the companies’ performance, and it seems 
to have the same effect (positive or negative) on all the acquired company’s funds. 
However, we do not find any evidence that independent stand-alone companies show 
inclination to performance deterioration after being bought by big financial groups. We 
find that two companies did improve their results while the performance of other two 
deteriorated after acquisition. 
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